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ESSAYS ON CURRENCY UNIONS AND TRADE
Gregory William Whitten, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2013
The countries constituting a currency union (a group of countries sharing a common cur-
rency) are thought to be more integrated among themselves than are other countries. The
first chapter revisits this belief in the tradition of articles published by Andrew Rose. The
first chapter demonstrates that only a subset of the currency unions examined by Rose are
as integrated through trade as Rose proposed. The extent of integration is related first and
foremost to the tariff rates prevailing within the union’s member countries as well as the
correlation of TFP shocks in the currency union. The seconde chapter demonstrates that
trade in certain types of manufactured goods benefit from greater trade integration than do
agricultural goods. The third chapter examines the ability for PPP to hold within currency
unions. The chapter finds that PPP fails to hold for several countries within a currency
union.
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1.0 WOULD A CURRENCY UNION BY ANY OTHER NAME BE AS
INTEGRATED?
1.1 INTRODUCTION
A series of papers authored or co-authored by Andrew Rose starting in the late 1990s con-
clude that countries sharing a single currency benefit significantly from this monetary ar-
rangement. The benefits manifest themselves through large increases in trade within the
currency union, ranging from 92% to 266%, results obtained by estimating gravity equations
of bilateral trade (Glick and Rose (2002)). These results, termed the “Rose effect” in Baldwin
(2006), have remained robust to multiple specifications, a rich set of control variables, and
attempts to alter the estimation strategy, such as Barro and Tenreyro (2007). Rose himself
acknowledges the surprising nature of the results: “In a world with derivative markets (at
least for developed countries), it is hard to believe that lower transactions costs could lead
trade to rise so much,” (Rose and van Wincoop (2001)). The authors continue by saying:
There are two ways to proceed. One can doubt the estimation results. Despite the extensive
search of Rose (2000), there may still be some omitted factor that drives countries both to
participate in currency unions and to trade more...
Another tack is to take a harder look at the empirical model.
Of the two paths outlined above by Rose, subsequent studies (Persson (2001), Barro
and Tenreyro (2007), Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2010)) have largely pursued the latter
option, seeking to understand the implied, strong effects of currency union membership as a
consequence of inappropriate estimation techniques that implemented the gravity equation
empirically. These studies have led to improvements in the estimation of bilateral trade
models. Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) critiques log-linearizations of the gravity equation
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which permit estimation through Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), the method typically used
by Rose and his co-authors. Such a linearization can produce inconsistent estimates in
the presence of heteroskedasticity. Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) advocates non-linear
estimation using the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator as a remedy
for the inconsistency.
This paper shows that when properly estimated, using the PPML estimator, the currency
union effect in a gravity equation implies no significantly higher integration for countries in
a currency union than otherwise similar countries but lacking a common currency. However,
a specification of the gravity equation that includes a vector of currency union dummies
(one variable for each currency union considered: “heterogeneous integration”) rather than
a single dummy variable (“homogeneous integration”: the practice in Rose (2000) and else-
where), shows that certain currency unions (such as the ECCU in the Caribbean and the
UEMOA in Africa) display levels of integration comparable to those found by Rose, while
other currency unions do not (such as the Eurozone or countries using the US dollar).
Given that the universe of currency unions displays such heterogeneous levels of inte-
gration, I turn to the literature on currency union formation for characteristics of currency
unions that could explain differences in the extent of integration. This paper contrasts the
criteria on integration mentioned in the foundational, theoretical papers of this literature
(namely Mundell (1961) and McKinnon (1963)) and the performance of these criteria in
explaining trade flows with the gravity equation. In particular, business cycle or Total Fac-
tor Productivity (TFP) shocks and inflation are little related to the range of trade patterns
in currency unions implied by results from a gravity equation with heterogeneous levels of
integration across currency unions.
Tariffs, in contrast, are closely related to the heterogeneous trade-enhancing effects. More
precisely, tariff rates and trade are positively correlated within a currency union. This finding
arises from the unexpected fact that, on average, countries in currency unions tend to trade
among themselves in goods subject to relatively high tariffs. Importers of high-tariffed
goods tend to favor exporters from within the union so as to avoid the costs incurred when
purchasing goods priced in a different currency, however small might be those transaction
costs. A common currency creates a price wedge between firms within the currency union
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and firms outside the currency union. This wedge favors firms in a country inside the
currency union when selling their goods to other countries inside the union. Though small,
this advantage translates into a large effect on trade. Thus, the results of this paper echo
those of Yi (2003) which describes circumstances under which small changes in tariffs can
generate disproportionately large increases in trade.
Other work, such as Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2010), also emphasizes a return to
considering the general economic characteristics of currency unions. However, Santos Silva
and Tenreyro (2010) re-examines the literature on currency union operation and formation
in order to broaden the criteria for a currency union’s effectiveness beyond the criterion of
greater intra-union trade. In contrast, this paper seeks answers to the long-puzzling result
of an unexpectedly large increase in intra-union trade associated with a common currency
by looking at the very characteristics Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2010) proposes as criteria.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology and
data used in the paper as well as how results are reported. Section 3 presents results that
replicate those in Glick and Rose (2002) and results that demonstrate the extent of hetero-
geneous integration across currency unions. Section 4 turns to the theoretical literature on
currency unions for potentially omitted variables that may be closely related to currency
union integration effects. Section 5 concludes.
1.2 DATA & METHDOLOGY
1.2.1 Methodology
The workhorse model for most empirical studies of currency unions is the gravity equation.
As articulated in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), the gravity equation for bilateral trade
from country i to country j at time t, Xijt, can be expressed as:
Xijt =
YitYjt
Y Wt
(
bijt
PitPjt
)1−σ
(1.1)
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Yit denotes nominal income in i and Y
W
t denotes nominal world income. bijt denotes “the
trade cost factor between i and j,” or “bilateral resistances,” (pp. 174-176). Pit denotes
“the consumer price index of i” or “multilateral resistances,” and reflects the price in i of
goods purchased from j, inclusive of trade costs bijt (pp. 174-176). Estimating equation
1.1 first requires answering three questions: how to specify the conditional expectation for
the regression, E
[
Xijt
∣∣Yit, Yjt, Y Wt , bijt, Pit, Pjt ]; how to account for (Pit, Pjt); and how to
specify the bijt.
As mentioned earlier, several papers in the past decade have focused on the first question
in order to explain trade flows generally and in order to understand the impact of a common
currency on trade. Econometric testing of economic theory generally involves specifying the
theoretical equation as a conditional expectation. This specification leads to an estimating
equation comprised of a theoretical equation plus a regression error, υijt. The regression error
is assumed to be uncorrelated with the regressors (here, Yit, Yjt, Y
W
t , bijt, Pit, Pjt). Traditional
estimation of the gravity equation first transformed equation 1.1 into a linear equation by
applying the logarithm function to both sides. The estimating equation became the log
transformation of equation 1.1 plus a regression error, ijt, assumed to be uncorrelated with
the regressors (here, logarithmic transformations of output, multilateral resistances, and
bilateral resistances).
Parameters estimated from a logarithmic-transformation of the gravity equation are tra-
ditionally interpreted as equivalent to what would be estimated from the multiplicative form
of the gravity equation. Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) demonstrates that this assumption
is generally false. This assumption would require either 1) the failure of Jensen’s inequality or
2) a particular and unlikely relationship between the error terms of the multiplicative model
and the log-transformed model. Heteroskedasticity in the multiplicative model exacerbates
the problem.1
The second question concerns how to control for the (Pit, Pjt) or “multilateral resistance
terms.” Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) explains how to solve for the (Pit, Pjt) exactly
as part of gravity theory. However, this process is computationally intensive. A common
alternative (Glick and Rose (2002), Baltagi et al. (2003), Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2010),
1See Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) for more details.
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Anderson and Yotov (2010)) is to use country fixed effects to control for the unobserved
price indices. Baldwin (2006), however, notes that this approach lacks the ability to account
for dynamic changes to the multilateral resistance terms. I rectify this problem by including
country-year fixed effects.
The inclusion of country-year fixed effects has two advantages. One, it controls for
changes to the multilateral resistances and related costs incurred by a country to engage in
trade with the world. Two, it follows the suggestion of Baltagi et al. (2003) as a way to
control for biases related to an unbalanced panel, which is the case here. A disadvantage
of this approach is that the large number of country-year interactions requires tremendous
computational resources in order to estimate the gravity equations for the full sample (1950-
2008), especially with a non-linear method such as PPML. To compensate, I restrict, for
a block of consecutive years, the coefficients of the country-year interactions for counrty i
to be all equal. The value of the block is denoted by the variable year_block_group. For
example, if year_block_group equals 5 and t ranges from 1980 to 1984, then the country-
year coefficients are all equal for a given country i for years 1980-1984. I estimate the model
for values of year_block_group equal to 15, 10, and 6 as a robustness check. The estimated
coefficients on the bijt and Yit, and change little. Table ?? presents the results.
The third question concerns bilateral resistances. Bilateral resistances represent trade
costs between a pair of countries. Trade costs are rarely observable directly. Many studies
proxy for these costs with variables describing the geography of the pair (such as distance
and contiguity); the political relations between the pair (were the countries part of a colonial
empire); and the economic relations between the pair (have the countries signed a trade
agreement; do the countries share a common currency). I describe the rich set of controls for
this paper in an appendix. The key element of bilateral resistances for this paper is whether
or not a pair of countries shares a common currency. Previous papers on the trade effects
of a common currency have controlled for a common currency with a single dummy variable
(such as Rose (2000), Rose and van Wincoop (2001), Glick and Rose (2002)). Denote this
variable as CUijt. If countries i and j share a common currency at time t, then CUijt = 1, else
0. This specification implies that currency union membership would have an equal effect, all
else held equal, for trade between France and Germany as well as for trade between Se´ne´gal
5
and Togo. I denote this specification as “homogeneous integration.” The estimated value of
the currency union coefficient is interpreted as a measure of integration among countries; an
equal effect on trade within all different currency unions implies an equal level of integration
with all different currency unions.
Although this paper includes estimation results for homogeneous integration, the pos-
sibility for “heterogeneous integration” seems more likely. As the set of currency unions
commonly studied ranges from formal, treaty-based unions (such as the Eurozone) to ad hoc
arrangements (such as dollarized countries), it seems unlikely that the influence of a single
currency would be similar across unions. Even the set of treaty-based unions displays a large
degree of heterogeneity. The Eurozone consists of some of the world’s richest while the East
Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU) and the Communaute´ financie`re africaine (CFA) zone
consist of former European colonies. The CFA zone, consisting almost exclusively of former
French colonies (Equatorial Guinea, a former Spanish colony, is an exception) in two different
regions (the UEMOA and CEMAC, each with a separate central bank), “survived decolo-
nization due in part to France’s efforts to maintain [it],” efforts that have included French
intervention to maintain a fixed exchange rate between the CFA Franc and the French Franc
(now the Euro) (Parmentier and Tenconi (1996), Masson and Pattillo (2005)). In contrast,
the United Kingdom made few such efforts in setting up the East Caribbean Central Au-
thority, later the East Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB), to administer the ECCU in the
mid-1960s (Van Beek (2000)). Furthermore, the policies of these central banks differ sub-
stantially. Reserves must exceed at least 20% of liabilities in the two central banks that
comprise the CFA zone, while reserves must exceed at least 60% of liabilities of the ECCB
(Masson and Pattillo (2005) and Van Beek (2000)). Each region within the CFA zone has
a separate currency, the West African CFA franc for the UEMOA and the Central African
CFA franc for the CEMAC. Although these currencies trade at a 1:1 ratio, neither currency
is legal tender in the other zone. Further, Gulde and Tsangarides (2008) argue that the
UEMOA and CEMAC are two distinct currency unions and display different levels of in-
tegration. Although this paper does not attempt to show mechanically how differences in
monetary policies across currency unions impact trade, this paper permits different unions
to have different intra-union trade-enhancing effects. Consequently, this paper includes a
6
vector of dummy variables for currency union membership, each variable corresponding to
a distinct currency union (including treating the UEMOA and CEMAC separately). The
dummy variables are defined similarly to CUijt. For instance, ECCUijt = 1 if i and j both
belong to the ECCU in time t, else 0. F-tests routinely reject the equality of all estimated
currency union coefficients, demonstrating that the effect of a common currency on trade
and, hence, the extent of integration differ tremendously across currency unions.
I now specify precisely the estimating equations used in this paper. Let T denote the
number of years. Let C denote the number of countries. I estimate a regression of the
following form for the OLS log-linear estimation on a pooled sample:
lnXijt = α1 ln (Yit × lnYjt) + α2 lnY Wt +
T∑
r=1
C∑
u=1
γrudru +
T∑
s=1
C∑
v=1
γsvdsv (1.2)
+αCUCUijt + β · bijt + ijt
where CUijt is the scalar (homogenous integration) or vector (heterogeneous integration) of
currency union membership.
The imposition of a single coefficient for lnYi and for lnYj is a consequence of the use of
“bilateral trade” for Xijt as opposed to exports. I will explain this distinction in section 1.2.2.
Y Wt is world GDP and bijt is a vector of variables to proxy for the bilateral trading costs.
The summation terms are the time-varying dummy variables that proxy for the multilateral
resistance. dru is a dummy variable equal to 1 if u = i and if t = r, else 0. A similar
definition applies to dsv. These variables control for the (Pit, Pjt) or multilateral resistance
terms. I estimate a regression of the following form for the PPML estimation on a pooled
sample:
Xijt = exp
(
α1 ln (Yit × lnYjt) + α2 lnY Wt +
T∑
r=1
C∑
u=1
γrudru +
T∑
s=1
C∑
v=1
γsvdsv (1.3)
+αCUCUijt + β · bijt) + υijt
I now discuss other aspects of the estimation. The PPML estimates in this paper come
from a pooled cross-sections of country pairs over time. Wooldridge (2002) discusses the as-
sumptions by which pooled PPML produces consistent estimates and appropriate standard
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errors. Wooldridge notes that it is not necessary to assume that the true conditional distribu-
tion of the data be Poisson in order to ensure consistency. The first necessary assumption is
that E [υlt | x′lt] = 0 for all t where l indexes country-pairs, t indexes years, x′lt is the vector of
independent variables, and υit is the error term. This assumption is a generalization to each
time period, t, of the standard, minimal assumption required to obtain consistent estimates
for M-estimation in a cross-section regression. The second assumption is the use of “fixed-T ,
large-N asymptotics,” in the words of Wooldridge (2002). Such asymptotics ensure that any
dynamic behavior in the regressors or error terms bias neither the coefficient nor standard
error estimates (when standard errors are calculated from a robust, “sandwich”-form of a
variance-covariance matrix). The time period, T , covered by the regressions ranges from 23
to 50 years. The size of the cross sections is the number of country pairs and ranges from
around 2000 to nearly 30000. These assumptions, along with the use of a robust, sandwich-
form variance-covariance matrix that clusters standard errors on country pairs, ensure that
the estimates from the PPML procedure in this paper are consistent and that the standard
errors are correct and “fully robust to the presence of serial correlation in the score and
arbitrary conditional variances,” (p. 670).2
1.2.2 Data
Although the Glick and Rose (2002) dataset is publicly available at Andrew Rose’s website
(whose ease of access I gratefully acknowledge), I construct a dataset from the sources he
cites, so as to extend the analysis beyond 1997, the last year in the data for Glick and Rose
(2002). I follow Glick and Rose (2002) in the construction of “bilateral trade” (as opposed to
exports) for the traditional OLS and PPML regressions. Bilateral trade in Glick and Rose
(2002) is defined as the average over all possible values of recorded exports and imports
between any two countries i and j. That is to say, “bilateral trade” is the average over all
of the following, subject to availability: exports f.o.b. from i to j; exports f.o.b. from j to
i; imports c.i.f. from i to j; imports c.i.f. from j to i. Combining export data with the
import data, which is generally more complete, owing to its importance in assessing customs
2See chapter 19 of Wooldridge (2002) for more details.
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duties, allows for the inclusion of more country pairs than would be possible using export
data alone.
The use of bilateral trade in this manner has implications for other variables. As there
is no meaningful distinction between exporter and importer in the definition of “bilateral
trade” used in the OLS and PPML methods, I do not distinguish between exporter’s GDP
or importer’s GDP. Consequently, for any pair of countries (i, j) in the traditional OLS and
PPML regressions, I restrict the coefficients for lnYi and lnYj to be equal.
The 210 entities in my dataset referred to as “countries,” for the sake of simplicity,
include not only sovereign nations but also regions such as Guam, Hong Kong, and the West
Bank and Gaza. Bilateral trade data comes from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics for
1948-2008. The value of GDP comes from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
for post-1960 values and the Penn World Tables Mark 6.2 for pre-1960 values.
The control variables that compose the bijt include the currency union relationships,
distance, other economic and geographic features, and colonial heritage. I use the CEPII
database for Great Circle distances, augmented with information obtained from the CIA
Factbook and from http:\\www.timeanddate.com.3 As the CEPII data political relation-
ships is time-invariant and as my period of interest spans the European decolonization of
Africa and Southeast Asia, I use the independence dates provided by the Factbook in order
to construct time-varying measures of political relationships. Information on regional trade
agreements comes from the WTO’s RTA database, augmented with information provided
by the various secretariats of the RTAs on changes in RTA membership. Currency union
membership comes from Glick and Rose (2002), augmented by IMF staff reports and other
publications. The term currency union in this literature refers not only to formal unions
such as the EMU or CFA but also to countries that fix their own currency to or use the
currency of another country, such as the use of the US Dollar in El Salvador and Liberia. A
list of currency union members and a full list of definitions of the other proxy variables for
bilateral resistance can be found at the end of the paper. I refer to the Eurozone as countries
in the EMU and those that have adopted the euro unilaterally (such as Macedonia).
3The CEPII database has been since replaced with a dataset constructed by Keith Head, Thierry Mayer
and John Ries.
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1.2.3 Marginal effects, coefficients, and relative effects
The paper uses linear and non-linear regressions of trade to understand the marginal effect
of currency union membership as a determinant of the level of trade. In a linear model, a
coefficient of a variable is the marginal effect of that variable. A coefficient is not a marginal
effect in a non-linear model, as the marginal change in the outcome variable depends not only
on the change in the regressor in question but also on the values of the other variables. Ratios
of coefficients, however, are ratios of marginal effects in linear and in non-linear models.
The body of this paper reports ratios of coefficients instead of the coefficients them-
selves in order to permit meaningful comparisons of the marginal effect of variables across
estimation techniques. Specifically, for any regressor, x, the paper reports:
− βˆx
βˆln distance
where βˆx denotes the coefficient estimated for regressor x and βˆln distance denotes the estimated
coefficient for the log of distance. There are two reasons for using distance as a benchmark
against which to evaluate the effect of other variables. First, distance is a classic regressor in
gravity equations and is often seen as good proxy for transportation costs. Second, βˆln distance
is negative and significant in all regressions. P-values and superscript symbols accompanying
the relative effect for variable x are based on Wald tests of the null hypothesis that the ratio
equals 0.4 Tables of relative effects are reported at the end of the paper.
1.3 RESULTS
1.3.1 Baseline homogenous integration
The OLS estimates on a longer panel of data yield results comparable to those found in
Glick and Rose (2002). The relative effect of currency union membership is 1.17 in Glick and
Rose (2002) while it is 0.8 in this paper (see table 1.1). Other variables have largely similar
relative effects in both papers (for instance, contiguity and commmon language). Contrasting
4∗∗ denotes 99% significance; ∗ denotes 95% significance; † denotes 90% significance.
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the OLS results in this paper with the PPML results, the PPML approach suggests that
a common currency does not have a significant effect on bilateral trade. Unexpectedly,
the estimated coefficient for currency union membership is actually negative, though the
coefficient is insignificant and the relative effect is small.5
Some variables have comparable relative effects on trade regardless of the estimation
technique used. Such variables include postcol, colonizer variant, and commlang off. Other
variables differ in relative effects on trade across estimation techniques. The PPML approach
gives much more weight to the GDP of countries i and j, 0.974, than do any of the other
approaches. World GDP is negative and significant for the PPML but not for the OLS.
Gravity theory implies a negative result, as trade from i to j is proportionate to Y
iY j
YW
where
Y W denotes world GDP. Both contiguity and a regional trade agreement have relatively large
effects in the PPML equation, but relatively smaller effects in the OLS. The relative effect
of a regional trade agreement is smaller than is the relative effect of a common currency for
OLS but not for PPML approach.
1.3.2 Baseline heterogeneous integration
Do the results from the PPML approach in table 1.1 mean that currency unions trade
less among each other and are less integrated than Rose previously claimed? Consider the
possibility that integration (measured by intra-union trade) differs across the set of currency
unions. Results from this specification are reported in table 2.3. The ECCU, UEMOA, the
Danish krone zone, and India-Bhutan unions are large, positive, and significant. Australia
and Singapore-Brunei have smaller, though still positive and significant, relative effects.
The estimated common currency effects for these currency unions are generally larger in
magnitude than are the effects for any other of the regressors, reinforcing the general message
in Rose’s work. Surprisingly, the PPML estimate for the Euro is insignificant, but the
relative effect is in line with previous findings (see Flam and Nordstrom (2006) and Micco
et al. (2003)). The CEMAC, the other CFA zone, has almost no effect. Previous studies
have suggested that the UEMOA is more integrated than is the CEMAC (see Gulde and
5Though not reported here, the results are comparable for the PPML if I truncate the sample at 1997,
the last year included in Glick and Rose (2002).
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Tsangarides (2008)). Dollarized countries demonstrate little integration through the use of
the US dollar. This result may be unsurprising as dollarization is often associated with
historical or political links with the US or as a credible hedge against inflation. This results
is also consistent with previous investigations of dollarization and trade (see Klein (2005)).
1.4 CURRENCY UNION CHARACTERISTICS AND TRADE
A natural question to ask after seeing the wide range of heterogeneous trade enhancement
among currency unions in table 2.3 is “what explains why one currency union has strong
trade-enhancing effects while another currency union does not?” The answer to this question
is not obvious. The explanations for the estimated effects of a currency union on trade do not
arise from country-specific characteristics but from interactions among multiple countries in
a non-additive fashion. Recall that the regression includes time-varying country indicators to
control the multilateral resistance terms. Consequently, these indicators absorb any country-
specific characteristics of trade, leaving the currency union indicators to control exclusively
for features of currency union behavior related to trade.
The currency union variables belong to the specification for bilateral resistance. As
this specification consists of reduced-form proxies for trade costs, the estimated coefficients
of the bilateral resistances lack direct economic interpretation. The existing literature on
the gravity equation offers little guidance on the question of assigning such an economic
interpretation to the estimated coefficients of the bilateral resistances. Thus, I turn to the
theoretical literature on currency unions for insight into interpreting the estimated bilateral
resistance coefficients. Recall that bilateral resistances pertain to trade costs between a
particular pair of countries. Therefore, interpreting the estimates of the currency union
effects requires identifying variables pertaining to interactions between a pair of countries in
the context of currency union operations.
To see if a particular economic variable, within a currency union, has influence on trade
so as to explain the estimated currency union effects in table 2.3, I re-estimate the gravity
equation with that variable. Denoting the variable as Z, the estimating equation enhanced
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with variable Z becomes:
Xijt = exp
(
α1 ln (Yit × lnYjt) + α2 lnY Wt + α3Zijt (1.4)
+
T∑
r=1
C∑
u=1
γrudru +
T∑
s=1
C∑
v=1
γsvdsv + β · bijt
)
+ υijt
where k indexes currency unions. The three variables represented by Z in this section are
Total Factor Productivity (TFP), inflation, and tariffs.
1.4.1 TFP
Mundell (1961) emphasizes that an optimal currency area is one where all regions within
the area suffer similar business cycle shocks at similar times. Hence, if a group of countries
constitutes an optimal currency area, they should regularly pass through the same phases
of the business cycle at roughly the same time. Consequently, the cross-sectional variance
of shocks to the business cycle (and, hence, economic growth) across countries would be
low, on average. Therefore, the currency union effect may merely represent fluctuations in
productivity across the currency union.
To test whether the trade-enhancing effects of the currency unions are consequences
of the synchronization of business cycles, I compute TFP and included it in the gravity
equation. I follow Caselli (2005) and use data from the Penn World Table Mark 6.2 in order
to construct TFP. Interestingly, the correlation between the currency union effects estimated
in table 2.3 and the cross-sectional standard deviation of TFP within the currency union,
averaged over time, is -0.62. This result supports the view in Mundell (1961). The negative
correlation means that low average variance in TFP implies a high benefit from a single
currency. Mundell also characterizes an optimal currency area by factor mobility within
the area and immobility between the area and outside areas. Trade, embodying a country’s
factors or serving as factors themselves (for example, trade in intermediate goods) proxies for
factor mobility. Therefore, it is not surprising to find a negative correlation between trade
within a currency area and the variance of productivity shocks across the currency area.
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To test whether the trade-enhancing effects of the currency unions are consequences of
the synchronization of business cycles, I include TFP in the gravity equation. I introduce
TFP into the estimating equation in the following way, using the notation from equation 1.4:
Zijt = ln (TFPit × TFPjt). Results are in table 1.3. TFP has a significant effect on trade.
However, the effects for currency unions change little, except for two unions: India-Bhutan
and the Eurozone. Interestingly, the relative effect of the Eurozone is larger and significant
than is it in the baseline model without TFP. That is to say, only when controlling for business
cycles does the Eurozone display a strong level of integration. This result contrasts with the
spirit of Mundell, that integration goes hand-in-hand with convergence across economies of
business cycle movements. TFP alone appears to have little ability to explain the intra-union
trade effects of a common currency for other currency unions.
1.4.2 Inflation
McKinnon (1963) proposes an alternative way to understand the motivation behind the
formation of a currency union and the consequences of the formation. McKinnon considers
the problem of a small, open economy where tradeable goods represent a large share of
consumption and where the economy seeks to establish a store of value for its currency.
McKinnon states that “one of the aims of monetary policy is to set up a stable kind of money
whose value in terms of a representative bundle of economic goods remains more stable than
any physical good,” (McKinnon (1963), p. 721). In such circumstances, McKinnon argues
that “pegging a currency of a small area to maintain its value in terms of a representative
bundle of imports from a large outside area is virtually the same thing as pegging it to the
outside currency,” (p. 722). If the “large outside area” is “a number of small areas which
trade extensively with each other,” then the above-mentioned pegging strategy is equivalent
to having “each currency pegged to the others,” (p. 722). In the context of currency unions,
a single member of a currency union represents the small, open economy and the set of other
countries in the union represents the “large outside area.” McKinnon also notes that “if we
move across the spectrum from closed to open economics, flexible exchange rates become
both less effective as a control device for external balance and more damaging to internal
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price-level stability,” (p. 719). Hence, the effects in table 2.3 may reflect the intersection of
an economy’s openness and its effectiveness at maintaining price stability.
To test the possibility that the effects from table 2.3 represent the intersection of an
economy’s openness and its effectiveness at maintaining price stability, I re-estimate equation
1.4 replacing the log of TFP with the log of inflation. I report only the results using a CPI,
though results from the GDP deflator are similar.6 Let Zijt = ln (CPIit × CPIjt). Table 1.4
shows the results from a model with the log of inflation for each country pair. The results
change little for the currency union coefficients from those in table 2.3. The relative effect
for the CEMAC is no longer significant. Thus, inflation seems little-related to the means by
which intra-currency union trade is increased.
1.4.3 Tariffs
The consideration of tariffs as a means to understand a currency union’s behavior may
seem, at first glance, an odd choice. As members of the best-known currency union, the
Eurozone, also belong to a common market with no internal tariffs, the idea that member
countries of other currency unions would be close enough to share a common currency but
not close enough to abolish internal tariffs seems surprising. Such taxes, however, exist.
As an example of how the Eurzone differs from other currency unions, the common tariff
from 1966-1974 on intra-union trade among most members of the UEMOA was 50 percent
(Masson and Pattillo (2005)). More generally, as a currency union is a group of countries
all of whom have pairwise fixed exchange rates, tariffs remain the unique policy by which
a government might influence trade directly. Corden (1997) discusses tariffs as second-best
policy to correct a current account imbalance under fixed exchange rates.
To explore this avenue, I use tariff data from the UNCTAD TRAINS database. These
data are available only from 1988 forward for countries using the Harmonized Commod-
ity Description and Coding System (or Harmonized System, “HS”). The database reports
6Note that the gravity equation inherently includes a representation of openness as envisioned by McK-
innon (imports over consumption). First, note that homothetic preferences assumed by Anderson and van
Wincoop (2003) imply that consumption is proportional to income. Next, exports from i to j are the imports
to j from i. As xij =
YiYj
YW
(
bij
PiPj
)1−σ
implies
xij
Yj
= Yi
YW
(
bij
PiPj
)1−σ
, the gravity model accounts already for
openness.
15
product-level tariff data as well as the average tariff rate on all goods imposed by country j
on country i’s exports in year t.7 To incorporate the tariff data into the gravity equation, I
modify the tariff data in a way similar to the construction of the bilateral trade data between
i and j. For country pair (i, j) in year t, I average the tariff rate imposed by i on j in t with
the rate imposed by j on i in t. Continuing the notation introduced in equation 1.4, Zijt is
the log of this average.
Examining just the data on tariffs for countries in currency unions reveals some surprises.
Figures 2.4 - 2.9 at the end of the paper show the simple, average tariffs imposed by countries
in a currency union on fellow members of a currency union (the blue line) and on countries
outside a currency union (red line). Countries in a currency union tend to import from their
fellow currency union members goods upon which the importing country imposes a higher
tariff. Even unions with little intra-union trade, such as the CEMAC and dollarized-zone,
display this pattern.
Table 1.5 shows the results from the gravity equation enhanced with the level of tariffs.
Tariffs have little effect on changing the estimation results. However, the inclusion of the
tariff level alone does not capture the entire response of trade to tariffs, particularly in a
context where exchange rate regimes differ across country pairs. Eichengreen and Irwin
(2010) analyze the effect of increasing tariffs across most of the developed world in the late
1920s and early 1930s. Eichengreen and Irwin (2010) demonstrate that the response of trade
to tariffs differs with the exchange rate regime prevailing in the importing country (gold
standard, Sterling bloc, gold bloc, exchange controls). Recognizing that the effect of tariffs
on trade differs across types of exchange rate regimes, I re-estimate the gravity equation
with the level of tariffs as well as interactions between currency union membership and tariff
levels in order to capture the fact that different currency union arrangements will lead to
different trade responses to tariffs. The specification is described in equation 1.5:
7As a robustness check, I have estimated the gravity equation on data starting at 1988 but without tariffs.
Results, though not reported here, are little changed from the results estimated on the full sample.
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Xijt = exp
α1 ln (Yit × lnYjt) + α2 lnY Wt + α3Zijt + ∑
k∈{CU}
αk (Zijt × kijt) (1.5)
+
T∑
r=1
C∑
u=1
γrudru +
T∑
s=1
C∑
v=1
γsvdsv + αCUCUijt + β · bijt
)
+ υijt
The inclusion of the currency union indicator variable, the tariff level, and the tariff-
currency union interaction alters the interpretation of the effect of a common currency on
trade. Previous studies of currency unions relied on a single, currency union-specific control
variable. These studies ascribed to the estimated coefficient the effect of a common currency
to reduce all trade costs and, consequently, to increase trade. However, previous studies of
currency unions also interpreted the estimated effects on trade of a common currency with
regard to the reduction of a particular trade cost: the cost to exchange currencies and hedge
against exchange rate uncertainty.
The specification in equation 1.5 splits the effect of a common currency on trade into 2
components. The currency union-tariff interaction captures the effect of a common currency
on trade through a country’s tariffs. The currency union indicator variable captures all
other effects, chief among which is the significance for trade of eliminating exchange rate
transaction costs.
The resulting relative effects from estimating equation 1.5, shown in table 1.7, demon-
strate a strong change from the baseline model’s relative effects reported in table 2.3. Only
one large union, the UEMOA, retains a positive currency union effect. Only two other unions
(India-Bhutan and Singapore-Brunei) have positive and significant effects. All other unions
have insignificant or negative and significant relative effects.
Unsurprisingly, the coefficient on the log of tariffs is negative and significant. Surprisingly,
the estimated coefficient for the interaction of currency union membership and the log of
average tariff rates is negative for only two of the currency unions examined (UEMOA and
India-Bhutan). The interaction is positive and significant for three large unions (ECCU,
CEMAC, dollarized countries) and positive and insignificant for Singapore-Brunei.
The literal (and counterintuitive) implication of the positive coefficient mentioned-above
is that tariffs predict higher trade within a currency union. A more reasonable conclusion
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is that trade within a currency union tends to consist of goods on which the currency union
members have imposed relatively high tariffs. In contrast, trade between a country in a
currency union and a country outside that union tends to involve goods on which the currency
union member imposes lower tariffs (recall figures 2.4 - 2.9). What leads to this pattern is
not obvious. The intersection between the composition of trade (high-tariffed versus low-
tariffed goods) involves decisions made by 2 parties (governments and firms) each of whom
has different objectives. Consequently, the traditional interpretation of the currency union
coefficients from the baseline model in table 2.3 as measures of currency union integration
differs depending on whether either party’s objective dominates.
Given a particular pattern of trade among currency union countries, the governments of
those countries may tariff certain goods more severely than other goods, in order to extract
rents if the demands are sufficiently inelastic. Viewed this way, the currency union effects
reported in table 2.3 represent the extent to which countries within a union continue to trade
among themselves despite trade costs (as the effects in table 2.3 come from the baseline
model, a model that does not condition fully on the trade costs). This interpretation seems
improbable as agents would not likely maintain for decades the elevated trading relations,
indicated by the baseline results in table 2.3.
It seems reasonable, instead, to suppose that given a tariff scheme imposed by a gov-
ernment, traders in a country seek to reduce transaction costs wherever possible. Importing
high-tariffed goods mostly from a country within the currency union, avoiding the cost as-
sociated with foreign exchange, may be such a method. Exporters inside currency union
countries benefit at the margin over exporters outside currency union countries when the
exporters sell into the currency union.
Given the above scenario, the currency union effects reported in table 2.3 represent the
extent to which agents within a currency union country reduce total transaction costs by
purchasing goods from inside the union rather than from outside. A common currency does
not lower transaction costs per se, as the coefficients on the non-interacted currency union
dummies in table 1.7 are largely insignificant or negative and significant. Rather, the common
currency becomes an avenue pursued by importers to avoid further trade costs in the presence
of high tariffs. The higher the tariffs, the more importers pursue this avenue to lower other
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trade costs, indicated by the positive coefficient on the currency-union tariff interaction.
Though long-standing beliefs held that a common currency should reduce trade costs, the
extent of this reduction was rarely thought sufficient to explain the large trade increases
found in Rose’s work (see Anderson and van Wincoop (2004)). The results in this paper
confirm that a common currency does little to lower trade costs directly. Including tariffs
in the gravity equation reconciles the belief that actual trade cost reductions engendered
by a common currency should be small with the empirical finding that a common currency
enhances trade significantly (the “Rose effect”). This reconciliation occurs because, in the
presence of other trade costs, namely tariffs, a common currency creates a wedge in the
overall price between importing from a firm within the currency union and importing from
a firm outside the currency union. The higher are tariffs within a currency union country,
the larger is a trader’s incentive to use this wedge, evidenced by the positive interaction
terms on tariffs and common currency in table 1.7. This finding echoes Yi (2003) where,
under vertical specialization (a good is assembled gradually in multiple countries and is,
consequently, exported and re-exported multiple times), modest differences in tariff rates
can produce large increases in trade.
The positive, significant tariff-currency union interactions are unlikely to be a result of
endogeneity. Endogeneity would be a concern only if factors determining the composition of
trade also determine the value of trade. Tariffs are frequently higher on goods in industries
with strong political influence (such as agriculture and basic textiles), industries whose prod-
ucts are generally cheaper than non-textile manufactured goods. This pattern holds both
for industrialized and developing countries (see Cline et al. (2004)). Consequently, there is
no positive correlation between the value of trade and tariff rates. However, manufactured
goods other than textiles but similar in price to textiles or agriculture are unlikely to have
the same intensity of tariff protection as do textiles or agricultural products. Consequently,
there is little to no negative correlation between the value of trade and tariff rates. Thus,
endogeneity has little potential to explain the results found here.
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1.5 CONCLUSION
The extent of trade integration within currency unions has received great attention in the
past decade. Although a modern estimation technique implies that, under homogeneous
integration, a common currency has little effect on trade, the same technique reveals hetero-
geneity in integration across currency unions where small unions in Africa and the Caribbean
display large trade-enhancing effects, but the Eurozone has a small effect. This paper turns
to the theoretical literature on currency union for guidance and finds that TFP and infla-
tion have little explanatory power regarding the diversity of currency union effects on trade.
Rather, the currency union effects display unexpected positive correlation with tariff rates
on the goods traded within the union. This paper demonstrates that for a country i, within
a currency union, the common currency provides a wedge between the prices faced by i’s
importers from exporters outside the union and from exporters inside the union. The higher
the tariff rates in i, the greater incentive on the part of i’s firms to minimize costs, such
as avoiding the costs to purchase foreign currency, however small these costs may be. As
a consequence, intra-union trade is larger than trade within a group of otherwise similar
countries, as found by Andrew Rose. Unlike Rose and others, this paper establishes that the
common currency itself does not lower trade costs directly. The common currency becomes
the means by which importers mitigate trade costs in the presence of high tariffs. Thus, this
paper validates Rose’s conclusion (greater integration among currency unions) and describes
the environment (high tariffs) in which a seemingly small reduction in trade costs (the use
of a common currency) indirectly leads to a large increase in trade and, hence, integration.
The results in this paper demonstrate that understanding the extent of intra-union trade
requires a close consideration of tariff policy. However, it remains unclear whether the extent
of intra-union trade is mainly a consequence of fiscal decisions (tariff policy in response to firm
behavior) or of firm-level decisions (firm behavior in response to tariff policy). Furthermore,
as tariff rates are gradually falling world-wide, including in currency union countries, the
effects on the overall economies of the currency unions are far from obvious. Addressing
these questions may require new tools. DSGE models of optimal monetary and fiscal policies
within a currency union, such as those by Gal´ı and Monacelli (2008) and by Ferrero (2009)
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provide a framework to describe the environment in which trade integration differs across
different types of goods within a single currency union. These models would be useful for
at least two questions. One, the models could quantify the importance of the two above-
mentioned motives in explaining the observed pattern of trade. Two, the models could
evaluate the welfare effects of reducing tariffs in a union whose exporters benefit from selling
into other, high-tariffing countries within the union. Future research will use these tools and
better explain the determinants of international trade, generally, as well as the intersection
of exchange rate regimes, trade composition, and tariffs in international trade.
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1.6 CURRENCY UNIONS AND THEIR COMPOSITION
1.6.1 East Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU)
Antigua and Barbuda Barbados (1965-1972) Dominica St. Kitts and Nevis St. Lucia St.
Vincent and the Grenadines
1.6.2 West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA)
Benin Burkina Faso Coˆte d’Ivoire Guinea-Bissau (1997-) Mali Mauritania (1960-1973) Niger
Senegal Togo
1.6.3 Communaute´ E´conomique et Mone´taire de l’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC)
Cameroon Central African Republic Chad Congo, Rep. Equatorial Guinea (1985-) Gabon
Madagascar (1960-1972)
1.6.4 European Monetary Union (EMU) / Euroized
Austria (1999-) Belgium (1999-) Cyprus (2004-) Estonia (2004-) France (1999-) Finland
(1999-) Germany (1999-) Greece (2001-) Ireland (1999-) Italy (1999-) Latvia (2005-) Luxem-
bourg (1999-) Macedonia (2002-) Malta (2005-) Netherlands (1999-) Portugal (1999-) Slovak
Republic (2006-) Slovenia (2007-) Spain (1999-)
1.6.5 Dollarized countries
American Samoa The Bahamas (after 1973) Bermuda Ecuador (after 2000) El Salvador (after
2001) Guam Liberia Marshall Islands Federated States of Micronesia Northern Mariana
Islands Palau Panama Puerto Rico Virgin Islands (U.S.)
1.6.6 India
Bhutan India
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1.6.7 Denmark
Denmark Færoe Islands Greenland
1.6.8 Australia
Australia Kiribati Tonga (until 1990)
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1.7 CONTROL VARIABLES AND DEFINITIONS
• CUijt is 1 if countries i and j belong to the same currency union in time t.
• ECCUijt is 1 if countries i and j belong to the East Caribbean Currency Union in time
t.
• UEMOAijt is 1 if countries i and j belong to the Union Economique et Mone´taire Ouest
Africaine (West African Economic and Monetary Union) in time t.
• CEMACijt is 1 if countries i and j belong to the Communaute´ Economique et Mone´taire
de l’Afrique Centrale (Central African Economic and Monetary Coummnity) in time t.
• AUSTRALIAijt is 1 if countries i and j both use the Australian dollar at time t.
• EMUijt is 1 if countries i and j both use the Euro at time t.
• BHUTANijt is 1 if i = India and j = Bhutan (or vice versa) at time t.
• BRUNEIijt is 1 if if i = Singapore and j = Brunei (or vice versa) at time t.
• ln distijt is the log of Great Circle distance between countries i and j.
• contigijt is 1 if countries i and j share a border.
• comlang offijt is 1 if countries i and j share a common or official language.
• rtaijt if 1 if countries i and j adhere to a trade agreement in time t.
• colonizer variantijt is 1 if i maintains or has maintained some level of sovereignty over
j up to time t, 0 otherwise. Sovereignty could be of an administrative nature, such as
the US relationship with Guam, or complete sovereignty, such as France’s control over
Algeria before 1962.
• comcolijt is 1 if countries i and j are both under the same, third-country colonizer in
time t.
• postcolijt is 1 if countries i and j were both under the same, third-country colonizer
before time t but are now independent.
• transcolijt is 1 if countries i and j were both under the same, third-country colonizer
before time t but only 1 country has left the colonial relationship.
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1.8 TABLES
Table 1.1: Estimation results : Baseline model, homoge-
neous common currency effects, 1950-2008
Dependent variable is the log of exports (OLS) or level
of exports (PPML).
Variable OLS PPML
− βˆx
βˆln distance
p-value − βˆx
βˆln distance
p-value
Pair belongs to the same currency union 0.799∗∗ (0.000) -0.287 (0.396)
ln (Yit × Yjt) 0.258∗∗ (0.000) 0.974∗∗ (0.000)
lnY Wt 0.318
∗∗ (0.000) -0.147† (0.075)
Pair belongs to a Regional Trade Accord 0.287∗∗ (0.000) 0.543∗∗ (0.000)
Countries are contiguous 0.315∗∗ (0.000) 0.801∗∗ (0.001)
Colonizer-colonized relationship 1.064∗∗ (0.000) 0.753∗∗ (0.001)
Countries are colonies of same country 0.868∗∗ (0.000) -1.56∗ (0.041)
Country pair transitioning from colonialism 0.415∗∗ (0.000) -0.637† (0.073)
Countries were colonies of same country 0.492∗∗ (0.000) 0.345∗ (0.033)
Shared common or official language 0.268∗∗ (0.000) 0.366∗ (0.01)
Number of observations 346254 346254
R2 0.76
Number of pairs 14912 14912
P-values in parentheses are calculated from robust standard errors
clustered on exporter-importer pair.
Time-varying country effects are not reported.
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Table 1.2: Estimation results : Baseline model, hetero-
geneous common currency effects, 1950-2008
Dependent variable is the level of exports.
Variable PPML
− βˆx
βˆln distance
p-value
East Caribbean Currency Union 3.945∗∗ (0.000)
West African Economic and Monetary Union 3.285∗∗ (0.000)
Central African Economic and Monetary Union 0.069 (0.911)
Australia zone 1.655∗∗ (0.001)
Dollarized zone -0.509 (0.183)
Euro zone 0.095 (0.454)
Danish zone 8.013∗∗ (0.000)
India-Bhutan 4.214∗∗ (0.000)
Singapore-Brunei 1.35∗ (0.014)
ln (Yit × Yjt) 0.892∗∗ (0.000)
lnY Wt 0.068 (0.411)
Pair belongs to a Regional Trade Accord 0.545∗∗ (0.000)
Countries are contiguous 0.793∗∗ (0.001)
Colonizer-colonized relationship 0.763∗∗ (0.001)
Countries are colonies of same country -1.511∗ (0.047)
Country pair transitioning from colonialism -0.612† (0.081)
Countries were colonies of same country 0.332∗ (0.041)
Shared common or official language 0.364∗ (0.011)
Number of observations 346254
Number of pairs 14912
P-values in parentheses are calculated from robust standard errors
clustered on exporter-importer pair.
Time-varying country effects are not reported.
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Table 1.3: Estimation results : Interaction of currency
unions and TFP, 1960-2008, Relative effects
Variable PPML
− βˆx
βˆln distance
p-value
East Caribbean Currency Union 4.232∗∗ (0.000)
West African Economic & Monetary Union 3.385∗∗ (0.000)
Central African Economic & Monetary Union -0.972 (0.21)
Australia zone 1.406∗ (0.027)
Dollarized zone -0.789† (0.071)
Eurozone 0.73∗ (0.04)
India-Bhutan 2.116 (0.115)
Singapore-Brunei 1.578∗ (0.01)
Eurozone × ln (TFPit × TFPjt) -1.412 (0.329)
East Caribbean Currency Union × ln (TFPit × TFPjt) 2.404† (0.087)
West African Economic & Monetary Union × ln (TFPit × TFPjt) -2.192 (0.144)
Central African Economic & Monetary Union × ln (TFPit × TFPjt) -2.974† (0.07)
Australia zone × ln (TFPit × TFPjt) 0.941 (0.278)
Dollarized zone × ln (TFPit × TFPjt) -0.874 (0.816)
India-Bhutan × ln (TFPit × TFPjt) 6.071∗ (0.048)
Singapore-Brunei × ln (TFPit × TFPjt) 0.1 (0.867)
ln (TFPit × TFPjt) 1.645∗∗ (0.000)
ln (Yit × Yjt) 1.117∗∗ (0.000)
lnY Wt -1.334 (0.264)
Pair belongs to a regional trade agreement 0.501∗∗ (0.000)
Countries are contiguous 1.236∗∗ (0.000)
Colonizer-colonized relationship 0.476 (0.106)
Country pair transitioning from colonialism -0.581 (0.148)
Countries were colonies of same country 0.42∗ (0.021)
Pair share a common language 0.152 (0.238)
Number of observations 223924
Number of pairs 12428
P-values in parentheses are calculated from robust standard errors
clustered on exporter-importer pair.
Time-varying country effects are not reported.
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Table 1.4: Estimation results : Interaction of currency
unions and inflation, 1960-2008, Relative effects
Variable PPML
− βˆx
βˆln distance
p-value
East Caribbean Currency Union 3.67∗∗ (0.000)
West African Economic & Monetary Union 3.076∗∗ (0.000)
Central African Economic & Monetary Union -0.573 (0.322)
Australia 0.815 (0.38)
Dollar zone -0.422 (0.313)
Eurozone -0.271 (0.105)
India-Bhutan 5.787∗∗ (0.000)
Singapore-Brunei 1.408∗∗ (0.001)
ECCU × ln Inflationijt -0.005 (0.959)
UEMOA × ln Inflationijt -0.032 (0.522)
CEMAC × ln Inflationijt 0.081 (0.321)
Dollar zone × ln Inflationijt 0.161† (0.088)
Eurozone × ln Inflationijt 0.185∗∗ (0.002)
India-Bhutan × ln Inflationijt -0.456 (0.152)
Singapore-Brunei × ln Inflationijt -0.02 (0.862)
ln Inflationijt (CPI) 0.012
∗ (0.036)
ln (Yit × Yjt) 0.765∗∗ (0.000)
lnY Wt 0.208
† (0.058)
Pair belongs to a Regional Trade Accord 0.597∗∗ (0.000)
Colonizer-colonized relationship 0.82∗∗ (0.000)
Countries are colonies of same country -2.887∗∗ (0.005)
Country pair transitioning from colonialism -0.563 (0.145)
Countries were colonies of same country 0.444∗∗ (0.003)
Countries are contiguous 0.788∗∗ (0.000)
Shared common or official language 0.317∗ (0.021)
Number of observations 217523
Number of pairs 12325
P-values in parentheses are calculated from robust standard errors
clustered on exporter-importer pair.
Time-varying country effects are not reported.
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Table 1.5: Estimation results : Tariffs and TFP, Relative
heterogeneous effects, 1988-2008.
Dependent variable is the level of exports.
Variable PPML
− βˆx
βˆln distance
p-value
East Caribbean Currency Union 3.524 (0.000)∗∗
West African Economic & Monetary Union 3.564 (0.000)∗∗
Central African Economic & Monetary Union -0.931 (0.161)
Australia Zone 2.052 (0.000)∗∗
Dollar zone -0.411 (0.379)
India-Bhutan 4.598 (0.000)∗∗
Singapore-Brunei 1.251 (0.027)∗
ln (Yit × Yjt) 0.817 (0.000)∗∗
lnY Wt 0.215 (0.137)
Pair belongs to a Regional Trade Accord 0.381 (0.000)∗∗
Colonizer-colonized relationship 0.412 (0.248)
Country pair transitioning from colonialism -0.498 (0.255)
Countries were colonies of same country 0.387 (0.025)∗
Countries are contiguous 1.349 (0.000)∗∗
Shared common or official language 0.282 (0.045)∗
ln tariffsijt 0.097 (0.286)
lnσtariffs 0.105 (0.033)
∗
Number of observations 69609
Number of pairs 9876
P-values in parentheses are calculated from robust standard errors
clustered on exporter-importer pair.
Time-varying country effects are not reported.
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Table 1.6: Estimation results : Tariffs (interacted) and
TFP, Relative heterogeneous effects, 1988-2008.
Dependent variable is the level of exports.
Variable PPML
− βˆx
βˆln distance
p-value
East Caribbean Currency Union -2.798 (0.48)
West African Economic & Monetary Union 8.385∗∗ (0.000)
Central African Economic & Monetary Union -8.936∗∗ (0.000)
Dollar zone -2.211∗∗ (0.000)
India-Bhutan 7.453∗∗ (0.000)
Singapore-Brunei 1.418∗ (0.01)
ECCU × ln tariffsijt 2.377∗ (0.04)
UEMOA × ln tariffsijt -1.726† (0.05)
CEMAC × ln tariffsijt 2.765∗ (0.01)
Dollar zone × ln tariffsijt 0.994∗∗ (0.000)
India-Bhutan × ln tariffsijt -0.69∗∗ (0.000)
Singapore-Brunei × ln tariffsijt 0.079 (0.62)
ln tariffsijt -0.099
∗ (0.01)
lnσtariffs 0.201
∗∗ (0.000)
ln (Yit × Yjt) 0.669∗∗ (0.000)
lnY Wt 0.447
∗ (0.01)
Pair belongs to a Regional Trade Accord 0.355∗∗ (0.000)
ln (TFPit × TFPjt) 1.312∗∗ (0.000)
Countries are contiguous 1.634∗∗ (0.000)
Colonizer-colonized relationship 0.253 (0.52)
Country pair transitioning from colonialism -0.483 (0.33)
Countries were colonies of same country 0.405∗ (0.04)
Shared common or official language 0.26 (0.11)
Number of observations 69609
Number of pairs 9876
P-values in parentheses are calculated from robust standard errors
clustered on exporter-importer pair.
Time-varying country effects are not reported.
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Table 1.7: Compare changes in year block group
(PPML): 1950-2008
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CUijt -0.18 -0.194 -0.199
(0.222) (0.224) (0.222)
ln (Yit × Yjt) 0.678∗∗ 0.63∗∗ 0.487∗∗
(0.025) (0.023) (0.021)
lnY Wt -0.189
∗∗ -0.096† 0.278∗∗
(0.058) (0.053) (0.062)
Pair belongs to a Regional Trade Accord 0.346∗∗ 0.352∗∗ 0.363∗∗
(0.055) (0.056) (0.061)
Log of distance -0.643∗∗ -0.642∗∗ -0.64∗∗
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Countries are contiguous 0.515∗∗ 0.514∗∗ 0.511∗∗
(0.118) (0.118) (0.118)
Colonizer-colonized relationship 0.496∗∗ 0.501∗∗ 0.504∗∗
(0.16) (0.159) (0.158)
Countries are colonies of same country -1.039∗ -1.013∗ -1.008∗
(0.486) (0.494) (0.496)
Country pair transitioning from colonialism -0.397† -0.405† -0.428†
(0.227) (0.222) (0.224)
Countries were colonies of same country 0.222∗ 0.226∗ 0.23∗
(0.101) (0.102) (0.102)
Shared common or official language 0.253∗∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.25∗∗
(0.088) (0.089) (0.089)
Number of observations 346254 346254 346254
Number of pairs 14912 14912 14912
Value of year_block_group 15 10 6
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Figure 1.1: Cemac average simple tariff rate
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Figure 1.2: Eccu average simple tariff rate
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Figure 1.3: Dollar zone average simple tariff rate
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Figure 1.4: Waemu average simple tariff rate
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2.0 A SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF CURRENCY UNIONS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The effect of a common currency on trade has received significant attention in the past
decade. Starting with the work of Andrew Rose (Frankel and Rose (1998), Rose (2000),
Rose and van Wincoop (2001), Glick and Rose (2002)), researchers have generally found
large effects of a common currency on trade for currency unions. However, the first chapter
in this dissertation demonstrates that only a few of the currency unions previously studied
(such as the East Caribbean Currency Union and the West African Economic and Monetary
Union) demonstrate as high of a level of integration by trade as found in the above-mentioned
studies. The first chapter also shows that the extent of integration is closely related to tariff
levels. In particular, the higher the level of tariffs prevailing across the currency union, the
greater is the intra-union trade. When controlling for tariffs, the results indicate that a
common currency appears to have little direct impact on the costs to trade. Consequently, a
common currency has little direct impact on the volume of trade. However, in the presence
of high tariffs, an importer is more likely to favor an exporter located in a country that
uses the same currency as does the importer, in order to reduce additional trade costs, the
implication of the afore-mentioned results. Consequently, trade and tariffs are positively
correlated within a currency union. Therefore, a common currency’s largest effect on trade
is an indirect effect, through tariffs. The positive correlation accounts for the large effects of
a common currency on trade found in previous studies.
Though the first chapter demonstrates that currency unions are different, left unanswered
is the question of why currency unions should differ along the particular dimensions of trade
enhancement via tariffs. Why should tariffs appear to expand integration for some unions
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but not for others? This chapter proposes the analysis of disaggregated trade as the first
step to answering this question. Recall that a common currency’s relevance as a control
variable for studying bilateral trade owes itself to the ability to forego transaction costs for
purchasing foreign exchange (see Rose (2000), Rose and van Wincoop (2001), and Anderson
and van Wincoop (2004)). Anderson and Yotov (2010) note that trade costs generally differ
depending on the nature or characteristics of the goods being traded.
Tariffs are unarguably a key trade cost and differ across commodity types. As a stylized
fact, tariffs on agricultural goods and low-skilled-intensive manufacturing goods tend to be
higher than are tariffs on other manufactured products, which in turn are higher than are
tariffs on resources such as minerals or petroleum. This pattern holds for both developed
and developing countries (see Cline et al. (2004)). If the common currency has a differential
impact on trade by commodity type and if the tariff variable is the sole variable able to
distinguish the composition of a trade flow (owing to the afore-mentioned stylized fact), it
is unsurprising that the tariff-currency union interactions would absorb the existence of a
differential effect by commodity type. Thus, the very significance of tariffs within currency
unions demonstrated in chapter 1 suggests that the ability of a common currency to enhance
intra-union trade by reducing trade costs will differ across unions as the composition of trade
differs across unions.
This chapter investigates sectoral differences in trade patterns across currency unions.
This chapter combines two strands of literature. The first strand is a long-standing literature
examining the effect on trade of hedging exchange rate volatility by focusing on currency
unions (in addition to the works of Rose, see Persson (2001), Micco et al. (2003), Klein
(2005), Barro and Tenreyro (2007), Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2010)). The second strand
of literature is the examination of trade determinants for disaggregated trade (Anderson
and Yotov (2010), Cissokho et al. (2013)). This literature emphasizes that trade costs,
controlling for which is a crucial step in any empirical analysis of trade, differ across product
types. The gravity equation or gravity-like equations have proven to be a useful framework
for analyzing aggregate trade flows and for estimating the magnitudes of different variables
on total trade costs (Eaton and Kortum (2002), Evenett and Keller (2002), Santos Silva
and Tenreyro (2006), Head et al. (2010)). Therefore, a framework that can bring the key
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elements of the gravity equation (national output by product type, iceberg trade costs or
“bilateral resistances,” and traded good price indices or “multilateral resistances”) to an
individual sector can bridge the two literatures to bring the well-established success of using
the gravity framework to a reliable and informative analysis of disaggregate trade flows. To
this end, Anderson and Yotov (2010) develop a gravity model for an individual class of goods,
similar to the structure developed in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). Though Anderson
and Yotov (2010) develop sector-specific gravity equation of bilateral trade to examine the
incidence of trade barriers on exporters and importers, this chapter is the first known use of
sector-specific gravity to analyze currency unions.
Most empirical work concerning currency unions has examined aggregate trade. How-
ever, the early literature on currency unions suggests that the composition of production
(and, by extension, trade) plays a key role in analyzing the motivation for and consequences
of sharing a common currency. Mundell (1961) argues for defining a common currency over
a region of economic activity where all sub-regions pass through the same phases of the
business cycle at the same time. In particular, the shocks to the business cycle that Mundell
emphasizes are sector-specific shocks. Hence, Mundell creates a strong association between
an optimal currency area and a particular industry. McKinnon (1963) states that a coun-
try’s decision to fix its exchange rates with trading partners or to maintain an independent
currency will depend on the composition of tradable and non-tradable goods within its econ-
omy. The composition of tradable and non-tradable goods likely differs across regions of
the world. As a currency union generally consists of countries within the same geographic
region, an understanding of how tradable goods and non-tradable goods differ across the set
of currency unions becomes an important consideration when analyzing a currency union
and its performance.
Despite the strong theoretical motivation for considering the composition of production
and currency unions, empirical work analyzing the intersection of currency union membership
and heterogeneity in trade composition is limited. Rose and Engel (2002) finds weak evidence
that currency unions display greater specialization in production and, hence exports. Gulde
and Tsangarides (2008) compares and contrasts the performance of the two zones within
the Communaute´ financie`re africaine, the Cemac and the Waemu, given the importance
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of petroleum extraction in the Cemac. The contribution of this chapter is to explore and
compare systematically the extent of integration across currency unions and sector of trade.
This chapter uses sector-specific gravity equations of bilateral trade to show that different
currency unions have different degrees of trade across different sectors. Several unions (the
Eccu, Waemu, Cemac, Rand zone, Australia zone, Danish zone, and India-Bhutan) display
a high level of integration through trade in manufacturing. The Eurozone and Dollarized
zone, by contrast, demonstrate little integration through trade in manufacturing but exhibit
a modest level of integration through trade in agriculture. Considering the trade in manu-
factured goods more closely, this chapter shows that currency unions demonstrate differing
levels of integration through trade within more narrowly-defined manufacturing sectors. In
particular, trade is highest for the Eccu, Cemac, Waemu, Australia zone, and Danish zone for
goods classified with 2-digit ISIC Revision 3 codes ranging from 20 to 37. India and Bhutan
as well as Dollaried countries exhibit a slightly higher degree trade integration for industrial
activity classified with 2-digit ISIC codes ranging from 15 to 19. The Eccu, Cemac, Waemu,
Australia zone, Danish zone, and Dollarized zones also exhibit increased trade, though of a
smaller magnitude, for industries with codes 15 through 19.
The organization of the chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 presents the sectoral grav-
ity equation and discusses the estimation procedure and the sources of data. Section 2.3
presents results from one level of disaggregating aggregate trade into agricultural trade and
manufactured goods trade.1 Section 2.4 presents results from a further disaggregation of
manufactured goods trade.
2.2 SECTORIAL GRAVITY EQUATION AND DATA
Following Anderson and Yotov (2010), I estimate a gravity equation for exports in a specific
class of goods, k, from country i to country j of the following form:
1Data on trade in services are not sufficiently and widely available for developing countries. Hence, this
chapter ignores trade in services.
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Xkij =
Y ki E
k
j
Y k
(
bkij
ΠkiP
k
j
)1−σk
+ kij σk > 1 (2.1)
where Xkij represents exports, Y
k
i represents the production of goods in class k, E
k
j
represents expenditures on goods in class k, and Y k is the sum of Y ki over all i: Y
k ≡∑i Y ki .
As in the previous chapter, bkij represents bilateral trading costs. I will proxy for these
costs with the rich set of controls used in the aggregate gravity equations. The dummy for
currency union membership (CU) and the tariff rate variable are the primary variables of
interest.
(
Πki , P
k
j
)
are price indices. I will follow the same practice as in the first chapter and
control for these variables with time-varying country dummy variables. σk is the elasticity
of substitution for class k. kij is the error term.
Ekj is not observed for most countries. Anderson and Yotov (2010) resolve this problem
in their paper by including a country fixed effect for j in the regression. This fixed effect
also controls for P kj . A separate country fixed effect for i controls for Π
k
i .
The data are a panel of country pairs at yearly frequency from 1976 to 2011 (for agri-
cultural data) and from 1980 to 2011 (for manufacturing data). Data on trade come from
UN COMTRADE while date on tariffs come from UNCTAD TRAINS, both part of World
Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS). When possible, agricultural and manufacturing are de-
fined according to ISIC Revision 3, first introduced in 1988. For data from earlier years and
for countries that maintained ISIC Revision 2 as the nomenclature for classifying industrial
activity, the ISIC Revision 2 classification is used (1976-1995). Data on tariffs are collected
under the Harmonized System nomenclature. Data on world agricultural and manufactur-
ing output come from the the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and from the
UNIDO INDSTAT databases. The sources for other variables (bilateral resistances such as
geographic distance, political relationships, currency union membership) are those cited in
the first chapter.
A preliminary look at the trade data shows a common pattern across currency unions
and important variations in this pattern. Table 2.1 reports averages over time of agricultural
exports as a share of merchandise exports and average of manufacturing exports as a share
of merchandise exports for the member countries of the currency unions studied in this
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chapter.2 In general, trade in manufacturing goods represents a large portion of exports
for currency union countries, especially compared to agriculture. The exceptions to this
pattern are the Cemac and Waemu. The significance of manufacturing trade varies widely,
accounting for between 30% and 40% of merchandise exports for the Dollairzed zone, the
Eccu, and India-Bhutan while accounting for well over half of exports for the Eurozone, the
Rand zone, and India-Bhutan.
The volatility of these shares over time differs noticeably across unions. Figures 2.1
and 2.2 show exports in each sector, agricultural and manufacturing, as a percent of total
merchandise exports for currency unions over time. The series for agricultural exports in
the Cemac and Waemu display substantial volatility while agricultural exports represent
consistently small shares of exports from other currency union countries. Consequently, the
data suggest that if a common currency has an effect on facilitating trade in a particular
sector, the sector is likely to be the manufacturing sector.
The tariff data indicate distinct levels of tariff rates across different classes of goods (see
table 2.2). However, unlike the conclusion in Cline et al. (2004), agricultural tariffs are not
uniformly higher over countries and over time than are manufacturing tariffs. Table 2.2 shows
that only the Eccu member countries possess an average tariff rate on agricultural imports
over time that is consistently higher than is the average tariff rate on manufacturing imports.
Figures 2.3 - 2.9 present the time series of tariff rates over time for each currency union. The
Cemac, Eccu, and India-Bhutan all have agricultural tariff rates that are higher than are
the tariff rates on manufacturing goods for a large share of time. In contrast, the Waemu,
Dollarized countries, Singapore-Brunei, and Australian zone have tariffs on manufacturing
goods that are generally higher than are the tariffs on agricultural goods. Both agricultural
tariffs and manufacturing tariffs follow a generally downward trend.
2These shares are for all export destinations, not just to fellow currency union countries. Additionally,
according to the World Development Indicators, “Merchandise export shares may not sum to 100 percent
because of unclassified trade.”
41
2.3 RESULTS FROM ONE LEVEL OF DISAGGREGATION:
AGRICULTURE VERSUS MANUFACTURING
Models that are multiplicative in the levels of variables, such as gravity equations, have
been estimated traditionally wiht Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), following a logarithmic
transformation. As noted in the first chapter, most work by Andrew Rose and others on
currency unions and trade has used the OLS estimation procedure. Tables 2.4 and 2.5 show
the coefficients obtained from estimating a logarithmic transformation of equation 2.1. The
results suggest almost no effect of a common currency on agricultural trade and a large effect
of a common currency on manufacturing trade. Note that the result for manufacturing trade
resembles the result found in the first chapter for aggregated trade when estimated by OLS.
OLS yields a clear distinction between agricultural trade and manufacturing trade. How-
ever, is the distinction shown in tables 2.4 and 2.5 the correct distinction? As stated in chap-
ter 1, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) would say no. In particular, the authors note that
applying a logarithm to the variables for the regression fundamentally distorts the stochastic
properties of the data and leads to inconsistent estimators. Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006)
propose PPML as a convenient way to estimate non-linear trade models in levels.
Since the PPML estimation is a non-linear estimation procedure, the estimated coeffi-
cients are not the estimated marginal effects of the level of the regressors on the level of
trade. The marginal effect of a regressor on the dependent variable is the statistic of in-
terest. However, ratios of coefficients are ratios of marginal effects. This chapter follows
the procedure used in the first chapter regarding the reporting of results from regressions.
Unless otherwise indicated, the values reported in the tables are not coefficients but ratios
of coefficients. In linear and in non-linear models, ratios of coefficients are ratios of marginal
effects. In particular, the value for any variable x is given as − βˆx
βˆln distance
and is referred to
as the relative effect. The negative sign preserves the intuition regarding the influence of
x on trade, given that the log of distance has a negative, significant effect on trade in all
regressions. The reported p-values are associated Wald tests of the null hypothesis that the
afore-mentioned ratio is equal to 0.
In contrast to the OLS results of tables 2.4 and 2.5, the PPML results reported in tables
42
2.6 and 2.7 show that the effect of a common currency on trade is positive and significant
for agricultural trade but negative and significant for manufacturing trade. Regardless of
estimation technique, the results show that there exists a clear distinction between a common
currency facilitating trade in the agricultural sector and trade in the manufacturing sector.
Consequently, there is an inherent economic difference in the effect of a common currency
on trade depending on the nature of the goods being traded. This difference merits further
consideration by examining different, intraunion patterns of trade across the set of currency
unions.
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 show that agricultural trade and manufacturing trade differ as to
the effect of a common currency on the costs to engage in trade. Are these differences
systematic across currency unions? The results in tables 2.8 and 2.9 suggest that the answer
is “yes.” First, the relative effects of variables on manufacturing trade generally resemble
those of aggregate trade for most individual conferences. Second, the relative effects of
variables on agricultural trade are generally lower than are the relative effects of variables
on manufacturing trade. The currency union effects in manufacturing trade are generally
larger than are those for agricultural trade. The Eccu, the Waemu, the Australia zone, the
Eurozone, and India-Bhutan all have relative effects on manufacturing that are of comparable
magnitudes to the relative effects to aggregate trade. Variables other than currency union
membership also have similar relative effects for aggregate and manufacturing trade. Such
variables include output (the product of GDPs from countries i and j for in aggregate trade,
sectoral output for country i in sectoral trade), contiguity, and sharing a common language.
The Cemac and dollarized zone are exceptions to the stylized fact that manufacturing
and aggregate relative effects resemble each other. The Cemac has an insignificant relative
effect for aggregate and agricultural trade, while it is significant and positive for manufac-
turing trade. The Cemac includes petroleum-rich countries such as Equatorial Guinea and
Chad that tend to export unrefined petroleum products outside the Cemac for processing
(Masson and Pattillo (2005) and Gulde and Tsangarides (2008)). The inclusion of these
exports in aggregate trade and the exclusion of the same exports from either agricultural
or manufacturing trade likely explain the different results. Other instances where the agri-
cultural relative effects resemble the relative effects for aggregate trade include the effect of
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a regional trade accord, the effect of a colonizer-colonized relationship, and the variable for
a country pair where one country remains a colony in an empire while another has left the
empire.
The second stylized fact, that the relative effects of variables on agricultural trade are
generally lower than are the relative effects of variables on manufacturing trade, applies to
most currency unions except the Dollar zone and the Eurozone. Both of those currency
unions have positive, significant relative effects for agricultural trade but negative (for both
zones) and significant (for the Dollar zone only) relative effects for manufacturing trade.
For variables other than currency union membership, the colonizer-colonized variable has a
larger and significant effect in agricultural trade whereas it has an insignificant relative effect
for manufacturing trade. These results may not be too surprising for two reasons. First, the
U.S. dollar is generally the currency used for pricing and then purchasing agricultural goods
(see Pick and Carter (1994)). Second, as agricultural products are often homogeneous across
producers, the gravity equation, often motivated through the supposition of a CES objective
function, may not be appropriate, owing to the lack of “love-of-variety”-like motivation.
Recall that the significance of tariffs may arise from a combination of two factors. Sup-
pose that a common currency has a differential impact on trade by commodity type, a
particular case of the general situation suggested by Anderson and Yotov (2010) regarding
trade costs. Note that in chapter 1, the tariff variable is the sole variable able to distinguish
the composition of a trade flow. If a common currency does have a differential impact on
trade by commodity type, then studying agricultural trade separately from manufacturing
trade should reduce the significance of tariffs in explaining trade within a currency union.
Controlling for all trade costs by including tariffs reduces the magnitude of the statistical
significance and/or the magnitude of the relative effects of currency union membership,
similar to the case for aggregate trade (see tables 2.10 and 2.11). For agricultural trade, the
Waemu and Dollar zones lose their significance. All stand-alone or inherent currency union
relative effects become insignificant. The tariff and currency union membership interactions
for the Eccu and India-Bhutan are positive and significant. For manufacturing trade, the
Eccu retains a large, significant relative effect when controlling for tariffs. The relative
of effect of the Cemac retains its significance and increases in magnitude. The Waemu,
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Dollar zone, and India-Bhutan lose significance and/or decrease in relative effect. The log
of tariffs is significant and negative for agricultural goods but insignificant and negative for
manufactured goods.
The interactions between currency union membership and tariff rates for disaggregated
trade are generally positive, as is the case with aggregate trade. Yet unlike the case for
aggregate trade, the interactions are generally insignificant or less significant, especially for
agricultural trade. Two tariff interactions between currency unions and tariff rates for agri-
cultural trade are positive and significant (the Eccu and India-Bhutan). However, only one
currency union, the Waemu, has a tariff interaction with a negative effect. Recall that the
Waemu-tariff interaction for aggregate trade also was negative and significant. Two tariff
interactions between currency unions and tariff rates for manufacturing trade are positive
and significant (the Australian zone and India-Bhutan). Most others are positive and in-
significant, though manufacturing trade in the Dollar zone has a negative and significant
interaction. Comparing the point estimates of the relative effects within the same currency
union but across goods type shows that agricultural trade has larger effects than does man-
ufacturing trade.
How do these results inform our assessment of the results in the first chapter? Does the
interpretation of the role of tariffs change, given fewer instances of statistical significance for
tariff and currency union membership interactions? Recall that the results from tables 2.8
and 2.9 show that the currency effects are larger for manufacturing trade than are the for
agricultural trade. Tariffs represent the only variable that can distinguish the composition
of a trade flow. Suppose that two trade flows are of equal, pre-tariff value, but differ in their
composition. If one trade flow contains a greater share of high-tariffed goods than does the
other trade flow, then the common currency facilitates the former trade flow to a greater
extent than does the latter trade flow. Hence, the interactions on common currency and the
level of tariff rates are significant in a regression of aggregate trade flows as no other variable
reveals heterogeneity in trade flow composition. Separating trade flows by composition in a
way that leads to a relatively high-tariff rate type of trade (agricultural) and a relatively low-
tariff rate type of trade (manufacturing) necessarily reduces the variance of tariff rates within
the trade flow of each type. Thus, the tariff rate itself becomes less significant in predicting
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trade within a currency union as the common currency’s effectiveness at facilitating trade
in the presence of high tariffs is preempted by the separation of trade flow regressions by
commodity, and, tariff-rate (low versus high) type. Recall also that the particular class
of high tariffed goods in this decomposition, agricultural goods, contains goods that are
generally transacted in a particular currency, the U.S. dollar. Therefore, variables pertaining
to the sharing of a common currency other than the U.S. dollar across countries are unlikely
to have a significant influence in determining trade. The point estimates of the relative
effects for currency union-tariff interactions are generally larger for agricultural trade than
for manufacturing trade. Hence, though the estimates be insignificant, they are consistent
with the pattern of a currency union being used more extensively for trade in high-tariffed
goods than in low-tariffed goods.
2.4 RESULTS FROM A SECOND LEVEL OF DISAGGREGATION
The results in tables 2.9 and 2.11 indicate a non-negligible currency union effect in the
manufacturing industry, an effect not fully explained by tariffs. This section of the chapter
investigates a further disaggregation but restricted to the manufacturing sector. Using the
ISIC 3 classifications, I disaggregate manufactured products into two types. The first type
consists of the 2-digit manufacturing codes, 15-19.3 The second type consists of all other
2-digit manufacturing codes, 20-37.4 The regressions in this section do not include Y ki ,
the sales of goods at destination prices from i in goods class k, as such variables are not
sufficiently available for currency union countries. As the time-varying importer fixed effects
control for Ekj , the time-varying exporter fixed effects will control for Y
k
i .
3food products and beverages; tobacco products; textiles; wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur;
tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear
4wood and products of wood and cork, except furniture; articles of straw and plaiting materials; paper and
paper products; publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media; coke, refined petroleum products
and nuclear fuel; chemicals and chemical products; rubber and plastics products; other non-metallic mineral
products; basic metals; fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment; machinery and equip-
ment n.e.c.; office, accounting and computing machinery; electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.; radio,
television and communication equipment and apparatus; medical, precision and optical instruments, watches
and clocks; motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers; other transport equipment; furniture; manufacturing
n.e.c.; recycling
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Table 2.12 shows clear distinctions in the tariff rates for the two divisions of manufactur-
ing products. Industries with codes 15-19, industries that process primary products, tend to
have higher tariffs than do more advanced industries classified with codes ranging from 20-37.
This difference is consistent with Cline regarding higher tariffs for agricultural-related and
low skilled-intensive manufacturing industries. These differences are persistent over time, as
indicated by figures 2.10 through 2.14. Thus, manufacturing trade alone likely creates an ag-
gregation bias regarding the effect of a common currency on trade. A further disaggregation
will eliminate this bias.
Tables 2.13 through 2.20 report the results from estimating equation 2.1 for the classes
of goods defined by ISIC 3 manufacturing codes 15-19 and 20-37. As was the case in the
previous section, there exists a clear distinction between the effect of a common currency on
trade for products with industry codes 15-19 and for products with industry codes 20-37,
regardless of the estimation technique used. Unlike the case with OLS, the nature of the
distinction is one of magnitude, not one of sign. For OLS, the effect of a common currency
under the assumption of homogeneous integration is positive and significant. For PPML,
the effect is negative and insignificant.
The results in tables 2.17 and 2.18 assume heterogeneous integration and indicate gen-
erally stronger currency union effects for products in codes 20-37. Exceptions include the
Dollarized zone and India-Bhutan. Given that products with codes 15-19 are closely linked
to agricultural production, it is not surprising to find stronger effects for trade in products
coded 20-37, particularly for the Dollarized zone where the common currency predicted a
significant, positive effect on intra-union, agricultural trade but a significant, negative effect
on intra-union, manufacturing trade.
Controlling for tariffs in tables 2.19 and 2.20 reveals more heterogeneity among the types
of manufactured goods and among currency unions. For goods with codes 15-19, the Eccu
and Dollarized zones demonstrate a higher direct level of integration after controlling for
tariffs as is evidenced by the currency union specific dummy variables. In contrast, the
Waemu, Cemac, and India-Bhutan zones lose significance after controlling for tariffs. Tariff
interactions with currency union membership are generally negative (except for the Cemac)
and significant (except for the Cemac and India-Bhutan). Surprisingly, the log of tariff rates,
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without interaction, is positive and significant. I interpret this result to mean that goods
with higher tariffs are traded more frequently than are goods with lower tariffs.
Comparing tables 2.18 and 2.20 shows that controlling for tariffs has a similar effect
for trade in goods with codes 20-37 as does it for aggregate trade. In table 2.18, only the
Dollarized zone and the Eurozone are not both positive and significant. Controlling for tariffs
in table 2.20 leaves only one currency union, the Waemu, with a positive and significant direct
effect. Unlike the results for aggregate trade controlling for tariffs, the interactions between
tariff rates and currency union membership are largely insignificant, except for the dollarized
zone where the interaction is negative and significant. The point estimates for the currency
union-tariff interactions are larger for trade in codes 15-19 than for trade in codes 20-37,
similar to the pattern in the agricultural versus manufacturing comparison.
2.5 CONCLUSION
Theoretical and empirical literature supports the hypothesis that a group of countries sharing
a common currency demonstrate higher degree of integration than does a group of otherwise
similar countries lacking a common currency. The first chapter of this dissertation shows
that currency unions differ in the extent of integration by trade and that tariffs tend to be
positively correlated with with the extent of integration.
This chapter analyzes the results in the first chapter of this dissertation. Both tariffs and
a common currency affect trade through their impact on the costs to trade. Anderson and
Yotov (2010) note that trade costs have different impacts on the volume of trade. Conse-
quently, understanding the interaction of two prominent trade costs requires a disaggregated
trade analysis. In order to identify particular sectors a common currency enhances trade, this
chapter uses the sector-specific gravity equation developed by Anderson and Yotov (2010) to
analyze bilateral trade flows in particular sectors. Trade within the Eurozone and the Dol-
larized countries tends to be in agricultural products. For other unions, intra-union trade
tends to be in manufacturing products. Tariffs tend to facilitate agricultural trade for the
Eccu and India-Bhutan while the same statement is true for manufacturing trade in the
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Rand zone, the Australian dollar zone, and India-Bhutan.
This finding is consistent with the finding in chapter 1 that tariffs play a key role in
determining the extent of intra-union trade. As tariffs tend to differ across sectors, it is
not surprising that intra-currency union agricultural trade differs from intra-currency union
manufacturing trade. A common currency tends to predict more trade within manufacturing
industries classified according to ISIC Revision 3 codes 20-37 than in industries classified with
codes 15-19. Tariff rates for these industries with codes 15-19 tend to be higher than are
tariff rates for industries with codes 20-37. After controlling for tariffs, the Eccu and the
Dollarized countries display a significant, inherent extent of trade in industries coded 15-19
while only the Waemu displays such effect for industries coded 20-37.
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Figure 2.1: Average share of agricultural exports by currency union
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Figure 2.2: Average share of manufacturing exports by currency union
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Figure 2.3: Average tariff rates across currency union countries for agricultural and manufacturing goods
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Figure 2.4: Average tariff rates across currency union countries for agricultural and manufacturing goods
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Figure 2.5: Average tariff rates across currency union countries for agricultural and manufacturing goods
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Figure 2.6: Average tariff rates across currency union countries for agricultural and manufacturing goods
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Figure 2.7: Average tariff rates across currency union countries for agricultural and manufacturing goods
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Figure 2.8: Average tariff rates across currency union countries for agricultural and manufacturing goods
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Figure 2.9: Average tariff rates across currency union countries for agricultural and manufacturing goods
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Figure 2.10: Average tariff rates across currency union countries for disaggregated manufacturing goods
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Figure 2.11: Average tariff rates across currency union countries for disaggregated manufacturing goods
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Figure 2.12: Average tariff rates across currency union countries for disaggregated manufacturing goods
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Figure 2.13: Average tariff rates across currency union countries for disaggregated manufacturing goods
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Figure 2.14: Average tariff rates across currency union countries for disaggregated manufacturing goods
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2.6 APPENDIX: TABLES
Table 2.1: Average shares of merchandise exports for currency unions, 1960-2011 (standard
deviations in parentheses)
Currency Union Agricultural exports Manufacturing exports
Australia zone 10.997 15.183
(10.012) (5.898)
Cemac 22.058 15.765
(10.633) (6.643)
Danish zone 3.178 31.131
(1.636) (11.875)
Dollaried zone 3.583 38.217
(2.416) (11.499)
Eccu 0.402 29.514
(0.543) (12.863)
Eurozone 1.785 77.849
(0.204) (2.86)
India-Bhutan 3.61 58.463
(2.28) (10.39)
Rand zone 3.941 61.524
(2.231) (9.901)
Singapore-Brunei 4.909 37.686
(5.539) (23.182)
Waemu 24.211 13.542
(10.939) (7.262)
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Table 2.2: Average tariffs (%) for currency unions, 1988-2011 (standard deviations in paren-
theses)
Currency Union Agricultural imports Manufacturing imports
Australia 0.105 1.09
(0.19) (1.7)
Cemac 22.69 21.55
(5.32) (2.7)
Eccu 28.29 16.91
(5.8) (2.9)
India-Bhutan 25.97 39.69
(14.23) (26.44)
Singapore-Brunei 0.76 1.72
(0.10) (0.88)
Rand Zone 4.3 11.86
(1.99) (2.82)
Dollarized zone 4.29 7.41
(2.62) (2.28)
Waemu 14.75 15.3
(2.89) (3.05)
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Table 2.3: Estimation results : Baseline model, hetero-
geneous common currency effects, 1950-2008
Dependent variable is the level of exports.
Variable PPML
− βˆx
βˆln distance
p-value
East Caribbean Currency Union 3.945∗∗ (0.000)
West African Economic and Monetary Union 3.285∗∗ (0.000)
Central African Economic and Monetary Union 0.069 (0.911)
Australia zone 1.655∗∗ (0.001)
Dollarized zone -0.509 (0.183)
Euro zone 0.095 (0.454)
Danish zone 8.013∗∗ (0.000)
India-Bhutan 4.214∗∗ (0.000)
Singapore-Brunei 1.35∗ (0.014)
ln (Yit × Yjt) 0.892∗∗ (0.000)
lnY Wt 0.068 (0.411)
Pair belongs to a Regional Trade Accord 0.545∗∗ (0.000)
Countries are contiguous 0.793∗∗ (0.001)
Colonizer-colonized relationship 0.763∗∗ (0.001)
Countries are colonies of same country -1.511∗ (0.047)
Country pair transitioning from colonialism -0.612† (0.081)
Countries were colonies of same country 0.332∗ (0.041)
Shared common or official language 0.364∗ (0.011)
Number of observations 346254
Number of pairs 14912
P-values in parentheses are calculated from robust standard errors
clustered on exporter-importer pair.
Time-varying country effects are not reported.
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Table 2.4: Estimation results: Agricultural trade, 1976-
2010
Dependent variable is the log of exports.
Variable OLS
βˆx p-value − βˆxβˆln distance p-value
Countries share a common currency -0.015 (0.91) -0.012 (0.909)
lnY agit 0.359 (0.000)
∗∗ 0.287 (0.000)∗∗
lnY agworld,t 0.116 (0.069)
† 0.093 (0.069)†
Pair belongs to a Regional Trade Accord 0.373 (0.000)∗∗ 0.299 (0.000)∗∗
Colonizer-colonized relationship 1.499 (0.000)∗∗ 1.2 (0.000)∗∗
Countries are colonies of same country 2.566 (0.014)∗ 2.054 (0.014)∗
Country pair transitioning from colonialism 0.493 (0.044)∗ 0.395 (0.044)∗
Countries were colonies of same country 0.333 (0.000)∗∗ 0.266 (0.000)∗∗
Countries are contiguous 0.962 (0.000)∗∗ 0.77 (0.000)∗∗
Shared common or official language 0.41 (0.000)∗∗ 0.329 (0.000)∗∗
Number of observations 186103
R2 0.5965
Number of pairs 17079
P-values in parentheses are calculated from robust standard errors
clustered on exporter-importer pair.
Time-varying country effects are not reported.
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Table 2.5: Estimation results: Manufacturing trade,
1980-2010
Dependent variable is the log of exports.
Variable OLS
βˆx p-value − βˆxβˆln distance p-value
Countries share a common currency 0.79 (0.000)∗∗ 0.472 (0.000)∗∗
lnY manufit 0.347 (0.000)
∗∗ 0.207 (0.000)∗∗
lnY manufworld,t 1.087 (0.000)
∗∗ 0.65 (0.000)∗∗
Pair belongs to a Regional Trade Accord 0.402 (0.000)∗∗ 0.24 (0.000)∗∗
Colonizer-colonized relationship 1.234 (0.000)∗∗ 0.737 (0.000)∗∗
Countries are colonies of same country 1.852 (0.012)∗ 1.107 (0.012)∗
Country pair transitioning from colonialism 0.271 (0.114) 0.162 (0.113)
Countries were colonies of same country 0.648 (0.000)∗∗ 0.387 (0.000)∗∗
Countries are contiguous 0.634 (0.000)∗∗ 0.379 (0.000)∗∗
Shared common or official language 0.575 (0.000)∗∗ 0.344 (0.000)∗∗
Number of observations 256644
R2 0.7407
Number of pairs 23022
P-values in parentheses are calculated from robust standard errors
clustered on exporter-importer pair.
Time-varying country effects are not reported.
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Table 2.6: Estimation results: Agricultural trade, 1976-
2010
Dependent variable is the level of exports.
Variable PPML
− βˆx
βˆln distance
p-value
Countries share a common currency 0.313 (0.001)∗∗
lnY agit 0.41 (0.000)
∗∗
lnY agworld,t 0.554 (0.000)
∗∗
Pair belongs to a Regional Trade Accord 0.575 (0.000)∗∗
Colonizer-colonized relationship 0.605 (0.000)∗∗
Countries are colonies of same country 1.118 (0.345)
Country pair transitioning from colonialism -0.983 (0.009)∗∗
Countries were colonies of same country 0.289 (0.016)∗
Countries are contiguous 0.546 (0.000)∗∗
Shared common or official language -0.002 (0.982)
Number of observations 307064
Number of pairs 24472
P-values in parentheses are calculated from robust standard errors
clustered on exporter-importer pair.
Time-varying country effects are not reported.
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Table 2.7: Estimation results : Manufacturing trade,
1980-2010
Dependent variable is the level of exports.
Variable PPML
− βˆx
βˆln distance
p-value
Countries share a common currency -0.145 (0.085)†
lnY manufit 0.8 (0.000)
∗∗
lnY manufworld,t 0.917 (0.000)
∗∗
Pair belongs to a Regional Trade Accord 0.833 (0.000)∗∗
Colonizer-colonized relationship 0.161 (0.347)
Countries are colonies of same country -0.085 (0.941)
Country pair transitioning from colonialism -0.361 (0.189)
Countries were colonies of same country 0.441 (0.000)∗∗
Countries are contiguous 0.599 (0.000)∗∗
Shared common or official language 0.41 (0.982)
Number of observations 277684
Number of pairs 24356
P-values in parentheses are calculated from robust standard errors
clustered on exporter-importer pair.
Time-varying country effects are not reported.
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Table 2.8: Estimation results : Agricultural trade, 1976-
2010
Dependent variable is the level of exports.
Variable PPML
− βˆx
βˆln distance
p-value
East Caribbean Currency Union -0.32 (0.767)
West African Economic & Monetary Union 1.154∗ (0.025)
Central African Economic & Monetary Union -0.893 (0.245)
Rand zone (South Africa) 2.281∗ (0.028)
Australia zone -0.505 (0.318)
Dollarized zone 0.621∗ (0.012)
Eurozone 0.332∗∗ (0.000)
Krone zone (denmark) 3.581∗∗ (0.000)
India-Bhutan 2.517∗∗ (0.007)
benelux -1.809∗∗ (0.000)
lnY agit 0.4
∗∗ (0.000)
lnY agworld,t 0.536
∗∗ (0.000)
Pair belongs to a regional trade agreement 0.541∗∗ (0.000)
Colonizer-colonized relationship 0.81∗∗ (0.000)
Countries are colonies of same country 1.109 (0.341)
Country pair transitioning from colonialism -0.96∗∗ (0.009)
Countries were colonies of same country 0.285∗ (0.017)
Countries are contiguous 0.548∗∗ (0.000)
Pair share a common language -0.005 (0.963)
Number of observations 307064
Number of pairs 24472
P-values in parentheses are calculated from robust standard errors
clustered on exporter-importer pair.
Time-varying country effects are not reported.
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Table 2.9: Estimation results : Manufacturing trade,
1980-2010
Dependent variable is the level of exports.
Variable PPML
− βˆx
βˆln distance
p-value
East Caribbean Currency Union 4.485∗∗ (0.000)
West African Economic & Monetary Union 3.022∗∗ (0.000)
Central African Economic & Monetary Union 3.082∗∗ (0.000)
Rand zone (South Africa) 1.742∗∗ (0.004)
Australia zone 3.288∗∗ (0.000)
Dollarized zone -1.534∗∗ (0.001)
Eurozone -0.004 (0.959)
Krone zone (denmark) 6.45∗∗ (0.000)
India-Bhutan 4.201∗∗ (0.000)
benelux -0.691∗ (0.024)
lnY manufit 0.832
∗∗ (0.000)
lnY manufworld,t 1.0
∗∗ (0.000)
Pair belongs to a regional trade agreement 0.822∗∗ (0.000)
Colonizer-colonized relationship 0.242 (0.229)
Countries are colonies of same country -0.555 (0.6)
Country pair transitioning from colonialism -0.306 (0.258)
Countries were colonies of same country 0.465∗∗ (0.000)
Countries are contiguous 0.619∗∗ (0.000)
Pair share a common language 0.333∗∗ (0.000)
Number of observations 277684
Number of pairs 24356
P-values in parentheses are calculated from robust standard errors
clustered on exporter-importer pair.
Time-varying country effects are not reported.
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Table 2.10: Estimation results : Agricultural trade with
tariffs, 1988-2010
Dependent variable is the level of exports.
Variable PPML
− βˆx
βˆln distance
p-value
East Caribbean Currency Union -3.959 (0.119)
West African Economic & Monetary Union 1.329 (0.262)
Central African Economic & Monetary Union -32.179 (0.278)
Rand zone (South Africa) -1.212† (0.098)
Dollarized zone 0.487 (0.158)
India-Bhutan -2.937 (0.148)
Log of tariffs on agricultural goods -0.122∗∗ (0.000)
Eccu × ln tariffsijt 1.937∗∗ (0.004)
Waemu × ln tariffsijt -0.186 (0.685)
Cemac × ln tariffsijt 9.337 (0.285)
USA × ln tariffsijt 0.076 (0.609)
India-Bhutan × ln tariffsijt 1.909∗∗ (0.004)
lnY agit 0.272
∗∗ (0.000)
lnY agworld,t 0.719
∗∗ (0.000)
Pair belongs to a regional trade agreement 0.169 (0.161)
Colonizer Variant 0.951∗∗ (0.000)
Transitional colonial relationship -1.216∗∗ (0.000)
Former subjects of a colonial empire 0.435∗∗ (0.000)
Countries are contiguous 0.14 (0.286)
Pair share a common language -0.305∗ (0.024)
lnσtariff 0.196
∗∗ (0.000)
Number of observations 31308
Number of pairs 6646
P-values in parentheses are calculated from robust standard errors
clustered on exporter-importer pair.
Time-varying country effects are not reported.
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Table 2.11: Estimation results : Manufacturing trade
with tariffs, 1988-2010
Dependent variable is the level of exports.
Variable PPML
− βˆx
βˆln distance
p-value
East Caribbean Currency Union 4.024∗∗ (0.008)
West African Economic & Monetary Union 4.562 (0.105)
Central African Economic & Monetary Union 8.167∗ (0.034)
Rand zone (South Africa) -0.822 (0.15)
Australia zone 5.551∗∗ (0.000)
Dollarized zone 0.73 (0.33)
India-Bhutan -2.929∗ (0.036)
Log of tariffs on manufactured goods -0.03 (0.582)
Eccu × ln tariffsijt 0.106 (0.814)
Waemu × ln tariffsijt -0.523 (0.653)
Cemac × ln tariffsijt -1.52 (0.216)
South Africa × ln tariffsijt 0.729∗∗ (0.000)
Australia × ln tariffsijt 2.197∗∗ (0.000)
USA × ln tariffsijt -0.832∗ (0.023)
India-Bhutan × ln tariffsijt 2.61∗∗ (0.000)
lnY manufit 0.772
∗∗ (0.000)
lnY manufworld,t 0.911
∗∗ (0.000)
Pair belongs to a regional trade agreement 0.946∗∗ (0.000)
Colonizer Variant -0.13 (0.664)
Transitional colonial relationship -1.845∗ (0.011)
Former subjects of a colonial empire 0.562∗∗ (0.000)
Countries are contiguous 0.87∗∗ (0.000)
Pair share a common language 0.302∗∗ (0.000)
lnσtariff 0.121
∗ (0.01)
Number of observations 64799
Number of pairs 13362
P-values in parentheses are calculated from robust standard errors
clustered on exporter-importer pair.
Time-varying country effects are not reported.
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Table 2.12: Average tariffs on manufacturing industries for currency unions, 1988-2011 (stan-
dard deviations in parentheses)
Currency Union Industries 15-19 Industries 20-37
Cemac 28.49 18.3
(5.47) (2.47)
Eccu 21.96 14.36
(1.88) (2.96)
India-Bhutan 42.25 27.2
(15.53) (18.61)
South Africa 19.48 9.95
(2.84) (4.36)
USA 12.13 7.4
(2.14) (3.2)
Waemu 18.91 13.38
(2.54) (1.48)
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Table 2.13: Estimation results : ISIC 15-19 trade, 1977-
2010
Dependent variable is the log of exports.
Variable OLS
− βˆx
βˆln distance
p-value
Countries share a common currency 0.388 (0.000)∗∗
lnY 15−19world,t 0.047 (0.000)
∗∗
Countries are contiguous 0.39 (0.000)∗∗
Shared common or official language 0.391 (0.000)∗∗
Pair belongs to a Regional Trade Accord 0.299 (0.000)∗∗
Colonizer-colonized relationship 0.925 (0.000)∗∗
Countries are colonies of same country 0.819 (0.074)†
Country pair transitioning from colonialism 0.312 (0.001)∗∗
Countries were colonies of same country 0.453 (0.000)∗∗
Number of observations 190027
R2 0.7
Number of pairs 17166
P-values in parentheses are calculated from robust standard errors
clustered on exporter-importer pair.
Time-varying country effects are not reported.
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Table 2.14: Estimation results : ISIC 15-19 trade, 1977-
2010
Dependent variable is the level of exports.
Variable PPML
− βˆx
βˆln distance
p-value
Countries share a common currency -0.038 (0.582)
lnY 15−19world,t 0.075 (0.009)
∗∗
Countries are contiguous 0.662 (0.000)∗∗
Shared common or official language 0.667 (0.000)∗∗
Pair belongs to a Regional Trade Accord 1.021 (0.000)∗∗
Colonizer-colonized relationship 0.697 (0.000)∗∗
Countries are colonies of same country -1.391 (0.086)†
Country pair transitioning from colonialism -1.107 (0.001)∗∗
Countries were colonies of same country 0.406 (0.009)∗∗
Number of observations 192017
Number of pairs 17413
P-values in parentheses are calculated from robust standard errors
clustered on exporter-importer pair.
Time-varying country effects are not reported.
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Table 2.15: Estimation results : ISIC 20-37 trade, 1966-
2010
Dependent variable is the log of exports.
Variable OLS
− βˆx
βˆln distance
p-value
Countries share a common currency 0.521 (0.000)∗∗
lnY 20−37world,t 0.237 (0.000)
∗∗
Countries are contiguous 0.277 (0.000)∗∗
Shared common or official language 0.358 (0.000)∗∗
Pair belongs to a Regional Trade Accord 0.192 (0.000)∗∗
Colonizer-colonized relationship 0.745 (0.000)∗∗
Countries are colonies of same country 0.483 (0.063)†
Country pair transitioning from colonialism 0.157 (0.073)†
Countries were colonies of same country 0.381 (0.000)∗∗
Number of observations 210898
R2 0.758
Number of pairs 18759
P-values in parentheses are calculated from robust standard errors
clustered on exporter-importer pair.
Time-varying country effects are not reported.
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Table 2.16: Estimation results : ISIC 20-37 trade, 1966-
2010
Dependent variable is the level of exports.
Variable PPML
− βˆx
βˆln distance
p-value
Countries share a common currency -0.1 (0.192)
lnY 15−19world,t 0.523 (0.000)
∗∗
Countries are contiguous 0.644 (0.000)∗∗
Shared common or official language 0.418 (0.000)∗∗
Pair belongs to a Regional Trade Accord 0.878 (0.000)∗∗
Colonizer-colonized relationship 0.209 (0.000)
Countries are colonies of same country -1.645 (0.000)∗∗
Country pair transitioning from colonialism -0.125 (0.626)
Countries were colonies of same country 0.32 (0.024)∗
Number of observations 213661
Number of pairs 19123
P-values in parentheses are calculated from robust standard errors
clustered on exporter-importer pair.
Time-varying country effects are not reported.
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Table 2.17: Estimation results : ISIC 15-19 trade, 1977-
2010
Dependent variable is the level of exports.
Variable PPML
− βˆx
βˆln distance
p-value
East Caribbean Currency Union 3.135∗∗ (0.000)
West African Economic & Monetary Union 1.266∗ (0.018)
Central African Economic & Monetary Union 2.913∗∗ (0.001)
Australia zone 2.273∗ (0.012)
Dollarized zone 0.632† (0.089)
Eurozone -0.056 (0.422)
Krone zone (denmark) 5.618∗∗ (0.000)
India-Bhutan 4.986∗∗ (0.000)
benelux -1.204∗∗ (0.000)
lnY 15−19world,t 0.075
∗∗ (0.009)
Countries are contiguous 0.666∗∗ (0.000)
Pair share a common language 0.664∗∗ (0.000)
Pair belongs to a regional trade agreement 1.016∗∗ (0.000)
Colonizer Variant 0.772∗∗ (0.000)
Common colonizer -1.289 (0.14)
Transitional colonial relationship -1.095∗∗ (0.001)
Former subjects of a colonial empire 0.413∗∗ (0.008)
Number of observations 192017
Number of pairs 17413
P-values in parentheses are calculated from robust standard errors
clustered on exporter-importer pair.
Time-varying country effects are not reported.
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Table 2.18: Estimation results : ISIC 20-37 trade, 1966-
2010
Dependent variable is the level of exports.
Variable PPML
− βˆx
βˆln distance
p-value
East Caribbean Currency Union 5.101∗∗ (0.000)
West African Economic & Monetary Union 3.766∗∗ (0.000)
Central African Economic & Monetary Union 3.218∗∗ (0.000)
Australia zone 2.368∗∗ (0.000)
Dollarized zone -2.064∗∗ (0.000)
Eurozone -0.04 (0.635)
Krone zone (denmark) 6.732∗∗ (0.000)
India-Bhutan 4.101∗∗ (0.000)
benelux -0.578† (0.083)
lnY 20−37world,t 0.695
∗∗ (0.000)
Countries are contiguous 0.623∗∗ (0.000)
Pair share a common language 0.405∗∗ (0.000)
Pair belongs to a regional trade agreement 0.835∗∗ (0.000)
Colonizer Variant 0.226 (0.274)
Common colonizer -1.864∗∗ (0.000)
Transitional colonial relationship -0.148 (0.553)
Former subjects of a colonial empire 0.302∗ (0.032)
Number of observations 213661
Number of pairs 19123
P-values in parentheses are calculated from robust standard errors
clustered on exporter-importer pair.
Time-varying country effects are not reported.
81
Table 2.19: Estimation results : ISIC 15-19 trade with
tariffs, 1988-2010
Dependent variable is the level of exports.
Variable PPML
− βˆx
βˆln distance
p-value
East Caribbean Currency Union 22.768∗∗ (0.004)
West African Economic & Monetary Union 4.823 (0.177)
Central African Economic & Monetary Union -24.891 (0.37)
Dollarized zone 2.289∗∗ (0.000)
India-Bhutan 19.644 (0.368)
Log of tariffs 0.305∗∗ (0.000)
Eccu × ln tariffsijt -5.739∗ (0.012)
Waemu × ln tariffsijt -1.051 (0.411)
Cemac × ln tariffsijt 8.629 (0.3)
USA × ln tariffsijt -0.72∗ (0.04)
India-Bhutan × ln tariffsijt -2.985 (0.602)
lnσtariff 0.282
∗∗ (0.000)
lnY 15−19world,t -0.099 (0.196)
Countries are contiguous 0.864∗∗ (0.000)
Pair share a common language 0.493∗∗ (0.008)
Pair belongs to a regional trade agreement 1.008∗∗ (0.000)
Colonizer Variant 0.17 (0.676)
Transitional colonial relationship 0.191 (0.815)
Former subjects of a colonial empire 0.797∗∗ (0.000)
Number of observations 38445
Number of pairs 8571
P-values in parentheses are calculated from robust standard errors
clustered on exporter-importer pair.
Time-varying country effects are not reported.
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Table 2.20: Estimation results : ISIC 20-37 trade with
tariffs, 1988-2010
Dependent variable is the level of exports.
Variable PPML
− βˆx
βˆln distance
p-value
East Caribbean Currency Union -4.197 (0.406)
West African Economic & Monetary Union 6.597∗ (0.046)
Central African Economic & Monetary Union 4.973 (0.379)
Australia zone -12.921∗∗ (0.000)
Dollarized zone 0.697 (0.455)
India-Bhutan -31.709 (0.239)
Log of tariffs -0.218∗∗ (0.002)
Eccu × ln tariffsijt 3.052 (0.11)
Waemu × ln tariffsijt -1.405 (0.411)
Cemac × ln tariffsijt -0.146 (0.938)
USA × ln tariffsijt -1.059∗∗ (0.003)
India-Bhutan × ln tariffsijt 13.618 (0.175)
lnσtariff 0.126 (0.118)
lnY 20−37world,t 0.561
∗∗ (0.000)
Countries are contiguous 0.961∗∗ (0.000)
Pair share a common language 0.359∗∗ (0.000)
Pair belongs to a regional trade agreement 1.022∗∗ (0.000)
Colonizer Variant -0.139 (0.623)
Transitional colonial relationship -0.615 (0.123)
Former subjects of a colonial empire 0.374∗∗ (0.004)
Number of observations 46457
Number of pairs 10571
P-values in parentheses are calculated from robust standard errors
clustered on exporter-importer pair.
Time-varying country effects are not reported.
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3.0 PRICE CO-MOVEMENTS WITHIN CURRENCY UNIONS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Trade flows within a currency union have long been used to gauge the extent to which
countries within that currency union are integrated.1 However, Santos Silva and Tenreyro
(2010) have suggested considering a wider range of criteria by which to characterize cur-
rency union formation and operation. One such criterion suggested by Cecchetti et al.
(2002) and others for characterizing the emergence of the newest and largest currency union,
the European Monetary Union (Eurozone), is the co-movement of aggregate price levels.
Such co-movements would suggest the existence of a well-defined and unified market within
the Eurozone, a hallmark of an integrated economy. In such an economy, price disturbances
within one country more easily manifest themselves in another currency union member coun-
try than in a country outside the union, owing to a common currency and monetary policy
operating throughout the currency area. The goal of this chapter is to investigate, for all
currency unions, the extent to which the price index prevailing within a member country of
a currency union co-moves with and can influence the price index of a fellow member of the
same currency and to conduct this investigation.
Examining price co-movements as a measure of integration emerges easily from consider-
ing trade flows as a measure of integration. The previous chapters in this dissertation have
shown that the extent of trade integration within a currency union varies across the set of
unions, depends largely on the tariff structure operating within the currency union countries,
and is greater for manufacturing goods than for agricultural goods. More opportunities for
trade should permit more opportunities for low-cost producers in one currency union mem-
1See Rose (2000) and Glick and Rose (2002)
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ber country to sell into relatively-higher cost producers, leading to greater trade. Thus, any
beneficial price shocks to one country in a currency union that is well-integrated through
trade should easily manifest themselves throughout the entire currency union.
This paper shows that the price levels within some currency unions are little cointe-
grated, suggesting that price levels are drifting apart over time. This result poses problems
for the maintenance of the fixed exchange rate over time, given Purchasing Power Parity
theory (PPP). At the same time, the aggregate price shocks of one country in a currency
union are more important than are the price shocks of a country outside the currency union
on any given country within the same currency union. Consequently, the currency union
countries exhibit features of a well-integrated economy. However, as the previous chapters in
this dissertation have noted, the extent of this integration differs tremendously across the set
of unions. Therefore, the finding of currency unions with little cointegration may be unsur-
prising. It is surprising, however, that the currency unions appearing to lack a robust degree
of cointegration should include the entire Eurozone as well as long-standing, anchor-client
relationships such as Australia-Tonga, India-Bhutan, or Singapore-Brunei.
The prospect of a single European market prompted research that investigates inflation
patterns across areas using a similar currency, often using American price behavior at the
city or state level to provide a benchmark against which to compare the emergence of an
integrated market within the Eurozone. Cecchetti et al. (2002) conduct unit root tests on
regional CPIs within the U.S in order to envision “the likely nature of inflation convergence in
the Euro area,” (p. 1081). The authors find that the half-life of a price shock within the U.S.
is approximately nine years, a surprisingly large amount of time for an economy thought to
be as well-integrated as the United States. Canova and Pappa (2007) look at the dynamics of
price indices in response to fiscal shocks in American states and European countries in order
to obtain a benchmark standard of what constitutes integration. Rogers (2007) examines the
dispersion of individual goods’ prices as well as of price indices. Comparing the dispersion of
prices in European cities with the dispersion of prices in American cities, the paper concludes
that the preparations for the Euro reduced price dispersion, that dispersion has not decreased
since 1998, and that price dispersion is still larger in the Eurozone than in the U.S. Faber and
Stokman (2009) find slightly greater integration than does Rogers (2007) for both tradable
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and non-tradable goods.
The justification for using inflation patterns within the US to forecast, in a very general
sense, the nature of inflation convergence in the Eurozone, arises from the US being “a
mature common currency area of similar regional diversity, size, and industrial development,”
(Cecchetti et al. (2002), p. 1081). A similar examination using the other currency unions
operating in the world as a benchmark also provides a useful comparison. Like the Eurozone
countries, the member nations of other currency unions are sovereign states that retain
fiscal autonomy to a large extent. Therefore, examining movements of price indices within
a currency union and comparing those movements for all currency unions (Eurozone and
others) provides an instructive lesson regarding price level convergence over an area using
the same currency but consisting of multiple countries.
Surprisingly, no work has yet undertaken this task, or even examined carefully the pattern
of price movements among the countries constituting a single currency union other than the
Eurozone. Abdih and Tsangarides (2010) follow a methodology similar to methodology used
in Berkowitz et al. (1998) and in this chapter in order to examine the two CFA zones (Cemac
and Waemu), but at a union-wide level rather than for individual countries.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 3.2 describes the methodology and
data used in this paper. Section 3.3 shows results when looking at the countries within a
currency union, one union at a time. Section 3.4 looks at individual pairs of countries where
the pair may contain two, one, or no countries inside a currency union, in order to see if the
countries within a union have more in common with each other than do they with countries
outside the union.
3.2 METHODOLOGY & DATA
The contribution of this chapter is to provide a single framework using PPP as a criterion
to gauge the extent of integration within a currency union and to compare and contrast
currency unions on this criterion. PPP is a long-standing theory that explains the long-run
value of the nominal exchange rate between two countries by linking the exchange rate to the
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relative prices of goods in both countries (see Cassel (2010) and Mark (2001), for example).
More precisely, the long-run value of the exchange rate is determined by the relative prices of
goods in the two countries in question. In the context of fixed exchange rates, such as those
that exist between two members of a currency union, PPP implies that the real exchange
rate should possess a constant, long-run mean. Aboslute PPP in a currency union directly
implies that the ratio of price levels equals the nominal exchange rate, 1, which is also the
real exchange rate. Relative PPP permits the real exchange rate to be a number other
than 1. In either case, PPP and fixed, stable, nominal exchange rates imply a constant real
exchange rate over time.
When testing for PPP, price indices, such as a CPI, are commonly used instead of
prices for a basket of goods (see Kim (1990), Lothian and Taylor (1996), and Coakley et
al. (2005), for example). As a stylized fact, price indices are non-stationary (see Engel and
West (2005)), a characteristic that undermines the likelihood that PPP will hold, as an
arbitrary combination of two, non-stationary random variables is unlikely to be stationary.
However, if there exists a particular linear combination of the price indices, the cointegrating
vector, that is stationary, then PPP can hold (see Enders (1995)). The coefficients of the
linear combination constitute the cointegrating vector. If Absolute PPP holds, all elements
of the cointegrating vector are 1. Any other cointegrating vector implies the presence of
Relative PPP. Therefore, testing the CPIs of the member countries of a currency union for
cointegration provides a direct way to test for PPP. The presence of cointegration implies
that PPP holds for a currency union. Yet, cointegration tests generally suffer from low
power. Consequently, the inability to reject a null of no cointegration (which is to say, PPP
does not hold) does not mean necessarily that there exists no stationary combination of the
variables in question. For the cointegration tests, I use the vecrank command in Stata to
implement the trace statistic test proposed by Johansen (1995). I conclude that there exists
v cointegrating vectors if the trace statistic computed for v fails to exceed the critical value
at 95% level of confidence.
Studying the extent to which PPP holds within a currency union requires as long of a
panel of price data as is possible. However, there exists a tradeoff between length of data for
a particular country and the number of countries in a given currency union for which data
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are available. This problem is exacerbated by entries and exits into currency unions, further
reducing the time-span for which data for all countries might be available. Consequently,
I perform multiple cointegration tests for each currency union, changing the composition
of the countries included and the time period examined. First, I test for cointegration on
the entire dataset available. For each subsequent cointegration test, I drop one country at
a time, the country with the fewest number of observations, so as to check the sensitivity
of the results and to obtain a longer sample period of data. The longer sample period
should improve the power of the test, facilitating a rejection of the null hypothesis of no
cointegration. I also use CPI data measured at quarterly frequencies and published by the
IMF’s International Financial Statistics. Using data measured at quarterly frequencies, as
opposed to yearly frequencies, improves the power of the test by increasing the number of
observations. However, the higher-frequency data are more susceptible to random shocks
that may drive the price levels apart from the long-run ratio that supports PPP.
3.3 CURRENCY UNION-WIDE INVESTIGATION
This section reports results from cointegration tests for the log of the CPI for member
countries within a currency union. The results are reported in tables 3.1 through 3.7. A
blank entry in a column means that the country is not included in the test over the time-
period specified by the column.
Most currency unions possess a cointegrating vector, though the results are sensitive to
the composition of countries and time frame examined. Among the smaller unions described
in table 3.1, none exhibit cointegrating relationships. The time span for which data are
available may be small, particularly for India-Bhutan and Brunei-Singapore. Given that
cointegration is a long-run property, the absence of cointegration for the India-Bhutan and
for Singapore-Brunei may be a consequence of a small sample size. However, both of those
unions have operated for several decades, during which price levels should have adjusted
and converged to overcome any long-run disturbances, demonstrating the presence of PPP.
Therefore, it is surprising that the price disturbances in each union are sufficient to prevent
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the rejection of the null of no cointegration even when examined with a short span of recent
data.
The Rand zone, described in table 3.2, also shows few instances of cointegration, even
when looking just at South Africa and Swaziland with over 40 years of data. Intriguingly,
a cointegrating vector exists only during the time when Namibia adhered to this union,
suggesting that Namibia, not the anchor nation of South Africa, plays a key role in the
stability of the Rand zone’s fixed exchange rate.
The Cemac, results for which are in table 3.3 has 3 cointegrating relationships. However,
this result seems sensitive to the inclusion of a relatively new member of that union, Equa-
torial Guinea. Including Equatorial Guinea and using data from 1985Q3 to 2012Q1, the
Johansen test finds at most 3 cointegrating vectors. Dropping Equatorial Guinea and using
data from a nearly identical time span, the test indicates only 2 cointegrating relationships.
Furthermore, the nature of the cointegrating vector changes. For 1985Q3 to 2012Q1, Gabon
receives a weight of zero and Chad receives a weight of 0.23. For 1984Q4 to 2012Q2, the
weight for Gabon shoots up to 48.52 while that for Chad increases (in absolute value) to
-33.85. Removing Chad but increasing the time span to 1981Q1 - 2012Q2 lowers the number
of cointegrating vectors to 1 and reduces Gabon’s weight to -2.01. Cameroon and Gabon,
two long-standing member countries with a long series of data available, do not demonstrate
cointegration in the log of their CPIs with the remaining members, as the coefficients on the
cointegrating vectors are 0.
Using data for all available Eccu countries from 1998 forward, there are 2 cointegrating
vectors for the set of six countries (see table 3.4). However, using data beginning in 1979
for four of those countries, there appears to be no cointegration. Yet, dropping St Kitts &
Nevis and starting just a few years earlier in 1976, the trace statistic test suggests that there
is a cointegrating vector.
The results for countries using the Euro (the Eurozone and ad hoc adopters such as
Montenegro) are even more surprising. Using the entire set of Eurozone members, there
are no cointegrating relationships. Even after removing recent or small adopters of the
Euro, such as Montenegro, San Marino, and Slovenia, the number of cointegrating vectors
is 0. Upon removing Greece (not one of the original member countries from 1999) from
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the sample, the trace statistic test indicates 7 cointegrating vectors. However, all of these
vectors necessitate that several countries have coefficients equal to 0. For the vector reported
in table 3.5, the countries with coefficients of zero include key, long-standing members of the
European community (such as Belgium and France), other “mainstream” countries (such
as Austria and Finland), and countries now seen at the periphery of the Eurozone (such as
Ireland and Spain) owing to the recent Eurozone crisis. However, Portugal, also arguably a
peripheral country, does not require a weight equal to 0, but merely 0.24 in order to achieve
a stationary combination of price levels.
The Dollarized zone displays 2 cointegrating vectors for the full sample of countries (see
table 3.6). However, after removing two recent dollarizers, Timor-Leste and El Salvador, the
number of cointegrating relationships increases to 3. Yet, for these three vectors, Ecuador
requires a weight of zero, suggesting that its price movements do not contribute to stable
exchange rates within the currency union. Further reducing the number of countries but
increasing the time span produces unexpected results. The three oldest countries using the
dollar (the US, Panama, and the Bahamas), exhibit a cointegrating relationship. However,
removing the Bahamas but extending the sample back to 1957 leads to no cointegrating
vector.
For the Waemu, longer time periods correspond to fewer cointegrating relationships (see
table 3.7). It is important to note that a 100% devaluation of the Franc CFA took place
in 1994 (see Parmentier and Tenconi (1996)). This regime change suggests the necessity to
check for PPP both before and after the devaluation. Seven countries from 1988-1994 exhibit
3 cointegrating vectors. However, the vectors require zero weights on Mali and Coˆte d’Ivoire,
the latter being seen as a center of economic power in the union. PPP also holds prior to
the devaluation, from 1970-1994. Yet, there is only 1 cointegrating vector over this period,
where Mali and Coˆte d’Ivoire again receive low weights in absolute value. Consequently, the
period after the devaluation may have been one where the exchange rate and price levels
moved more in harmony with each other for maintaining the fixed exchange rate than did
they in the era prior to the devaluation.
The results in this section suggest that PPP holds for the member countries of most
currency unions. However, the results are sensitive to the composition of countries and
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the time-span examined. Furthermore, for PPP to hold, the weights assigned to member
countries must often be 0. Consequently, the ability for PPP to hold depends limited to a
proper subset of the countries within the union. To understand more clearly which countries
contribute to or detract from the ability of PPP to hold, the next section will examine
cointegration on a bilateral basis. Testing for cointegration on a pairwise basis isolates
particular co-movement behavior at a disaggregated level. In particular, the next section will
follow the methodology in Berkowitz et al. (1998) of conducting cointegration tests followed
by Granger Causality tests. To understand if a given country has particular influence on
the price movements of another country within the union, I conduct the Granger Causality
tests on bilateral country pairs. If the country pair exhibits a cointegrating relationship, the
Granger Causality test will be performed on levels of the data. If there is no cointegrating
vector, the Causality test will be performed on first differences of the data. See Berkowitz
et al. (1998) for more details.
3.4 BILATERAL INVESTIGATION
This section reports results from pairwise tests of cointegration and Granger Causality for
the log of the CPI. Table 3.8 shows the share of country pairs within each currency union
that exhibit cointegration of the log of the CPI. The first column of results examines currency
union country pairs only over a timer period when both countries belong to the same union.
The second column of results examines the country pair for a currency union for all available
time periods, regardless of changes in union membership.
A few unions (Cemac, Waemu, Dollarized zone) exhibit a rate of pairwise cointegration
that is higher than is the rate of cointegration found among countries not in a currency
union. The Eccu has a noticeably smaller rate of cointegration. Apart from the Rand zone,
the anchor-client unions (Australia, India-Bhutan, Singapore-Brunei) generally exhibit zero
rates of cointegration. Surprisingly, the rate for the Eurozone is quite low. This result may
be a consequence of the relatively short time-frame (13 years) for which the Euro has existed.
As cointegration is a long-run phenomenon and as other unions have existed for decades, it
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may not be surprising to find such a low rate in the recently-formed Eurozone. When the
time-frame is extended to include all years for which quarterly data are available, the rate for
the Eurozone increases to the mid-30s, though is still lower than is the rate of cointegration
for the Cemac.
The interpretation of the results in table 3.8 is surprising. In well-established unions,
such as the Eccu and Waemu, fewer than half of the country pairs have price levels that move
together. Lacking cointegration, the price levels of a pair of countries are non-stationary and
do not follow a common stochastic process. In order for PPP to hold in even a relative
sense and for the currency union to survive in the long run, the ratio of the price levels must
have a constant long run mean. However, if there exist multiple pairs of countries within a
currency union such that the ratio of price levels for each pair is not cointegrated, then the
ratio of price levels is not constant over time. Such results suggest that the currency union
cannot continue operating in its current form in the future, but is likely to dissolve.
The results from table 3.8 not only describe the nature of price movements within a
currency union. They also inform how Granger Causality tests should be conducted. If the
price levels are cointegrated for a given country pair, then the Granger Causality test for
the price levels of that country pair should be conducted on the levels themselves. Lacking
cointegration, the Causality test is performed on first differences of the price levels. Table
3.9 shows the results of the Granger Causality tests. Some unions, such as the Cemac,
Dollarized zone, and Rand zone, have rates of cointegration similar to the rates of Granger
Causality. For the Eccu, the Waemu, and the Eurozone, the rates of Granger Causality are
much higher than are the rates of cointegration.
To understand the results in tables 3.8 and 3.9 more clearly, tables 3.10 and 3.11 partition
the above results into two tables. Table 3.10 presents country pairs where there exists any
price co-movement or inflation causality. The column entitled “Coefficient for country 2”
gives the cointegrating vector’s coefficient for country 2 when the coefficient for country 1
is normalized to 1. A ←− indicates that inflation in the second country indicated in the
pair Granger causes inflation in the first country indicated in the pair. A −→ indicates that
inflation in the first country indicated in the pair Granger causes inflation in the second
country indicated in the pair. A ←→ indicates causality in both directions. Table 3.11
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presents country pairs lacking any link between inflation levels.
In general, most of the cointegrating coefficients for country 2 in table 3.10 are negative.
This result makes sense, given that the coefficients for country 1 are normalized to 1. Recall
that the theory of Relative PPP indicates that the ratio of price levels between countries
1 and 2, P1
P2
, should equal some constant, k. For Absolute PPP, k = 1. Expressed in logs,
Relative PPP becomes lnP1− lnP2 = ln k. The cointegrating vector for these country pairs
is some (pi1, pi2) such that pi1 lnP1 + pi2 + lnP2 = 0. If Relative PPP holds, then pi2 < 0.
This sign restriction holds for all cointegrated pairs, except for Ireland and Germany in the
Eurozone.
In the Cemac, Cameroon is cointegrated with only one other country, Equatorial Guinea,
while it lacks cointegration with all other countries. Since Equatorial Guinea is a relative
newcomer to the Cemac, it seems odd that a long-standing member would not be cointe-
grated with other long-standing members but would be cointegrated with a country whose
fundamentals would be the least expected to move in harmony with those of other Cemac
members. Interestingly, 2 of the 4 time periods investigated in section 3.3 for the Cemac had
cointegrating vectors where the coefficient on Cameroon was 0. Consequently, it seems that
PPP does not hold for Cameroon and any other member of the Cemac. Despite Cameroon’s
lack of cointegration, Cameroon Granger causes price movements in most other Cemac coun-
tries except Gabon.
In the Eccu, there exist few instances of cointegration but many instances of bidirec-
tional Granger Causality. A country pair that includes either Dominica or Anguilla never
demonstrates cointegration. Recall from table 3.4 that the coefficient on Anguilla for the
cointegrating vector is 0. St. Vincent and the Grenadines is cointegrated with only one
other country, St. Kitts and Nevis, yet demonstrates bidirectional Granger Causality with
all other countries except Anguilla. Thus, PPP appears not to hold for Anguilla, Dominica,
and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.
As is the case with the Eccu, the Eurozone has few instances of cointegration. As is
the case with the Cemac, those instances generally involve relatively new countries (Slovenia
and Montenegro, the latter having adopted the Euro ad hoc). Even the Benelux countries
whose economic integration pre-dates the earliest conception of the EU show few instances
93
of Granger Causality or cointegration. The Belgian price level Granger causes the price level
in Luxembourg, though the two are not cointegrated. Surprisingly, the price level in small
Luxembourg Granger causes the price level in the relatively larger Netherlands. Table 3.11
shows that the Netherlands and Belgium are neither cointegrated nor demonstrate Granger
Causality.
In the Dollarized zone, four of the six cointegrating relationships are between small
countries. Only two involve the US and are with the Bahamas and Ecuador. Interestingly,
price levels in Panama and the US are not cointegrated, though Granger causality exists
between both countries. The US Granger causes price levels in other countries (Ecuador,
El Salvador, and The Bahamas). The country pairs that lack any co-movement all include
Timor-Leste. This result is not too surprising as Timor-Leste adopted the US dollar relatively
recently (2000) and is outside the traditional sphere of US influence in Latin America.
For the Waemu, every country pair is either cointegrated or exhibits Granger causality,
though instances of the latter outnumber instances of the former. Relatively large economies
in the union, such as Se´ne´gal and Coˆte d’Ivoire, tend not to be cointegrated with other
countries, though the two afore-mentioned countries have bivariate Granger causality for the
price level. The remaining and relatively smaller members such as Be´nin, Mali, Guinea-
Buissau, Niger, and Togo, account for most instances of cointegration.
Among smaller unions, the results are generally as expected regarding causality if not
cointegration. Inflation rates in Singapore and Brunei are not cointegrated though Singapore
does Granger cause inflation in Brunei. In the Rand zone, South African price levels Granger
causes price levels in Swaziland and Namibia. This result is unsurprising, given South Africa’s
dominance as an anchor in the union. Australia and Tonga exhibit neither cointegration nor
Granger Causality.
Could a currency union country be more likely to demonstrate price co-movements with
a country outside the currency union? If currency unions are well-integrated economies,
the answer should be “no.” The next two tables address this possibility. Table 3.12 re-
produces the results in table 3.8 but also includes the share of country pairs that exhibit
cointegration in their price movements where exactly one member of the pair belongs to a
particular currency union while the other member does not belong to that currency union.
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For the anchor-client unions (Australia zone, Dollarized Zone, India-Bhutan, Rand zone,
and Singapore-Brunei), I exclude pairs that contain the anchor and any country outside the
union. As an example, Tonga is the only country in the Australia zone for which data ex-
ist. Consequently, table 3.12 indicates that there exists no cointegration between Australia
and Tonga while 14.02% of country pairs consisting of Tonga and any country other than
Australia demonstrate cointegration.
The results in table 3.12 indicate for most unions a higher frequency of cointegration
between countries where exactly one country is in a currency union and one country is outside
the union than between countries where both belong to the same currency union. The Cemac,
Dollarized zone, Rand zone, and Waemu are exceptions. However, this result seems to be
driven by anchor-client type unions consisting of only 2 countries. Excluding the Australia
zone, India-Bhutan, and Singapore-Brunei which are (in this example) unions consisting only
of two countries, just over half of the unions have higher incidence of cointegration between
union members than between one union member and one non-union member. Therefore,
price level movements for two countries within the same, multi-country currency union are
more likely to resemble each other than are the rates of inflation for one country inside a
currency union and one country outside the same currency union. However, the likelihood
seems to be not noticeably greater.
Table 3.13 repeats the examination made in table 3.12 but using Granger Causality
results. Here, Granger Causality between two countries within the same union occurs more
frequently than does Granger Causality between one country in a currency union and one
country outside a currency union. Only two unions, the Australia zone and India-Bhutan,
are exceptions to this result. Rates of Causality within the Rand zone and outside the Rand
zone are almost equal, with a slightly higher rate of incidence for Causality within the Rand
zone. In general, the inflation rate of a country within a currency union tends to be more
responsive to the inflation rate of another country within the same currency union than to
the inflation rate of a country outside the currency union.
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3.5 CONCLUSION
In order to understand better currency union operations, recent articles have suggested
expanding the criteria for characterizing currency unions beyond the value of intraunion
trade (Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2010)). As a specific example, Cecchetti et al. (2002)
suggests comovements in price levels between the currency area’s constituent members as a
criterion for evaluating the extent of integration of a currency union. This paper provides
a comprehensive assessment of all currency unions based on the inflation patterns of the
members of a currency union. In general, the Granger Causality results suggest that a
country within a currency union responds more to price shocks from another currency union
member than to price shocks from a country outside the currency union.
However, other indicators of price level comovement cast doubt on the sustainability of
the fixed exchange rates among members of the union. The cointegration results suggest that
price levels within the currency union are drifting apart, undermining the ability for PPP
to hold in the long run and, consequently, the stability of the union. Although price shocks
may be transmitted more easily between two countries within the same currency union than
between a union and non-union country (evidenced by the Granger Causality results), the
nature of these shocks may be putting excessive, long run pressure on the stability of the
fixed exchange rate (evidenced by PPP theory and the cointegration results).
For many unions, there appears to exist countries which are “odd man out” in the sense
that they are rarely if ever cointegrated with any other country: Dominica and Anguilla in the
Eccu; Cameroon in the Cemac; Timor-Lest in the Dollarized zone; Se´ne´gal and Coˆte d’Ivoire
for the Waemu. In fact, given that rates of cointegration between a currency union country
and a non-member of the currency union are higher than are rates between two countries
within the same currency union, it seems likely that new, alternative monetary unions could
be formed where the inflation rates would move in a more commensurate manner.
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3.6 TABLES
Table 3.1: Cointegrating vectors for smaller currency unions
Time-period 1976Q3 - 1990Q4 2003Q4 - 2012Q4 2000Q3 - 2012Q1
Countries Australia Bhutan Brunei Darussalam
Tonga India Singapore
# of cointegrating vectors 0 0 0
Table 3.2: Cointegrating vectors for the Rand zone
1973Q3 - 1997Q1 2002Q3 - 2012Q4 1965Q3 - 2012Q4
Lesotho
Namibia 1.0
South Africa -0.45
Swaziland -0.51
# of cointegrating vectors 0 1 0
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Table 3.3: Cointegrating vectors for the Cemac
1998Q3 - 2012Q1 1985Q3 - 2012Q1 1984Q4 - 2012Q2 1981Q1 - 2012Q2 1968Q3 - 2012Q4
Cameroon -0.91 0.00 0.00 0.51
Central African Republic 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Chad -0.24 0.23 -33.85
Equatorial Guinea 0.12 -0.72
Gabon -0.98 0.00 48.52 -2.01
Republic of the Congo 0.28
# of cointegrating vectors 1 3 2 1 098
Table 3.4: Cointegrating vectors for the Eccu
1998Q3 - 2012Q4 1980Q3 - 2012Q4 1979Q3 - 2012Q4 1976Q3 - 2012Q4 1975Q3 - 2012Q4
Anguilla 0.00
Dominica -0.51
Grenada 1.00 1.00
St. Kitts & Nevis -0.25
St. Lucia -0.19 -0.29
St. Vincent & the Grenadines -0.14 -0.57
# of cointegrating vectors 2 0 0 1 0
99
Table 3.5: Cointegrating vectors for the Emu
2007Q3 - 2012Q1 2005Q3 - 2012Q1 2003Q3 - 2012Q4 2001Q3 - 2013Q1 1999Q3 - 2013Q1
Austria 0.00
Belgium 0.00
Finland 0.00
France 0.00
Germany 1.00
Greece
Ireland 0.00
Italy 0.97
Luxembourg -0.69
Montenegro
Netherlands -1.29
Portugal 0.24
San Marino
Slovenia
Spain 0.00
# of cointegrating vectors 0 0 0 0 7
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Table 3.6: Cointegrating vectors for the Dollarized zone
2002Q3 - 2012Q3 2001Q3 - 2012Q3 2000Q3 - 2012Q3 1973Q3 - 2012Q3 1957Q3 - 2013Q1
The Bahamas 2.79 -0.41 -0.69 -2.03
Ecuador 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panama 0.84 -0.03 0.00 -0.41
El Salvador -2.32 -0.17
Timor-Leste -0.86
United States 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
# of cointegrating vectors 2 2 3 1 0
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Table 3.7: Cointegrating vectors for the Waemu zone
1997Q3 - 2012Q4 1988Q1 - 1994Q4 1970Q3 - 1994Q4 1988Q1 - 2012Q4 1968Q3 - 2012Q4
Be´nin 0.00
Burkina Faso 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Coˆte d’Ivoire -0.58 0.00 0.1 -0.86 -0.49
Guinea-Bissau 1.12
Mali -2.7 0.00 -0.47 -1.47
Niger -0.61 0.16 0.09 -0.05 -0.23
Se´ne´gal 1.95 -1.15 0.14 1.66 -0.09
Togo 0.19 -0.48
# of cointegrating vectors 2 3 1 1 1
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Table 3.8: Share of country pairs exhibiting cointegration in ln CPI
Currency Union Only during CU membership Over entire length of sample
Australia zone 0.00 100.00
Cemac 58.82 64.71
Dollaried zone 40.0 20.0
Eccu 23.53 25.00
Eurozone 7.62 37.14
India-Bhutan 0.00 0.00
Rand zone 33.33 33.33
Singapore-Brunei 0.00 0.00
Waemu 46.43 35.71
Pair not in a currency union 33.91 34.01
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Table 3.9: Share of country pairs exhibiting Granger Causality in ln CPI
Currency Union Only during CU membership Over entire length of sample
Australia zone 0.00 50.00
Cemac 55.88 61.76
Dollaried zone 36.67 33.33
Eccu 52.94 62.5
Eurozone 37.62 57.62
India-Bhutan 0.00 0.00
Rand zone 25.00 25.00
Singapore-Brunei 50.00 50.00
Waemu 71.43 62.5
Pair not in a currency union 33.79 33.98
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Table 3.10: Cointegration and Granger Causality results
Currency Union Country Pair (country 1 & country 2) Cointegrated Coefficient for Granger
country 2 Causality∗
CEMAC Gabon - Chad Yes -0.628 −→
CEMAC Congo, Rep. - Cameroon No ←−
CEMAC Central African Republic - Cameroon No ←−
CEMAC Gabon - Congo, Rep. Yes -0.577 ←→
CEMAC Congo, Rep. - Chad Yes -1.313 ←→
CEMAC Congo, Rep. - Central African Republic Yes -1.064 ←−
CEMAC Equatorial Guinea - Cameroon Yes -1.659 ←−
CEMAC Gabon - Central African Republic Yes -0.801 ←→
CEMAC Equatorial Guinea - Chad Yes -1.549 ←→
CEMAC Gabon - Cameroon No −→
CEMAC Chad - Cameroon Yes -1.087 ←−
CEMAC Gabon - Equatorial Guinea Yes -0.418 ←−
CEMAC Equatorial Guinea - Central African Republic Yes -1.806 ←→
CEMAC Chad - Central African Republic No −→
ECCU St. Vincent and the Grenadines - Grenada Yes -1.146 ←→
ECCU Dominica - Anguilla No ←−
ECCU St. Vincent and the Grenadines - Dominica No ←→
ECCU St. Lucia - Grenada Yes -1.281 −→
ECCU Grenada - Dominica No −→
ECCU St. Vincent and the Grenadines - Anguilla No −→
ECCU St. Kitts and Nevis - Anguilla No −→
ECCU St. Lucia - St. Kitts and Nevis No ←→
ECCU St. Vincent and the Grenadines - St. Lucia No ←→
ECCU St. Lucia - Dominica No ←−
ECCU St. Vincent and the Grenadines - St. Kitts and Nevis Yes -0.786 ←→
ECCU St. Kitts and Nevis - Grenada Yes -1.293 ←→
∗ The arrow’s direction indicates which country’s price level Granger causes Continued on next page
the other country’s price level. ←→ indicates bicausality.
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Table 3.10 – continued from previous page
Currency Union Country Pair (country 1 & country 2) Cointegrated Coefficient for Granger
country 2 Causality∗
EMU Slovenia - France Yes -1.145 ←→
EMU Ireland - Belgium No ←−
EMU San Marino - Finland No −→
EMU Portugal - Belgium No ←−
EMU San Marino - Italy No −→
EMU Ireland - Greece No ←−
EMU Greece - Germany No ←→
EMU Spain - Greece No ←→
EMU France - Belgium No ←−
EMU Ireland - Germany Yes 0.589 ←−
EMU Luxembourg - France No −→
EMU Montenegro - Ireland Yes -3.327 None
EMU Slovenia - Luxembourg Yes -0.753 ←−
EMU San Marino - Netherlands No −→
EMU Spain - Netherlands No ←→
EMU Netherlands - Germany No −→
EMU Spain - Germany No ←−
EMU Italy - France No −→
EMU Portugal - Netherlands No ←→
EMU Netherlands - Italy No −→
EMU Luxembourg - Germany No ←→
EMU Slovenia - Netherlands Yes -0.881 None
EMU Slovenia - Italy Yes -0.823 ←−
EMU Portugal - Italy No ←−
EMU Italy - Austria No −→
EMU Netherlands - Luxembourg No ←−
EMU Netherlands - Finland No −→
∗ The arrow’s direction indicates which country’s price level Granger causes Continued on next page
the other country’s price level. ←→ indicates bicausality.
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Table 3.10 – continued from previous page
Currency Union Country Pair (country 1 & country 2) Cointegrated Coefficient for Granger
country 2 Causality∗
EMU Greece - Belgium No ←−
EMU Luxembourg - Finland No −→
EMU Spain - San Marino No ←−
EMU San Marino - Portugal No −→
EMU Spain - Portugal No −→
EMU Germany - France No ←→
EMU San Marino - Greece No −→
EMU Spain - Italy No ←−
EMU Greece - Finland No ←−
EMU Belgium - Austria No −→
EMU Netherlands - Austria No −→
EMU Germany - Finland No ←−
EMU Portugal - Greece No ←−
EMU Slovenia - Greece No ←−
EMU Spain - Belgium No ←−
EMU Spain - Ireland No ←−
EMU Germany - Austria No −→
EMU Italy - Ireland No −→
EMU Slovenia - Germany No ←−
EMU Portugal - Germany No ←→
EMU Netherlands - Greece No ←→
EMU Slovenia - Montenegro Yes -0.853 None
EMU Spain - Austria No ←→
EMU Italy - Greece No −→
EMU San Marino - Luxembourg No −→
EMU San Marino - France No −→
EMU Luxembourg - Greece No ←−
∗ The arrow’s direction indicates which country’s price level Granger causes Continued on next page
the other country’s price level. ←→ indicates bicausality.
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Table 3.10 – continued from previous page
Currency Union Country Pair (country 1 & country 2) Cointegrated Coefficient for Granger
country 2 Causality∗
EMU Italy - Germany No −→
EMU Finland - Austria No −→
EMU Montenegro - Germany No −→
EMU Netherlands - Ireland No ←−
EMU Portugal - Finland No ←−
EMU Spain - France No ←→
EMU San Marino - Ireland No −→
EMU Spain - Slovenia No −→
EMU Luxembourg - Belgium No ←−
EMU Ireland - Finland No −→
EMU Slovenia - Belgium Yes -0.735 ←−
EMU Montenegro - Belgium No −→
EMU Luxembourg - Italy No ←−
EMU Spain - Finland No ←−
EMU Greece - France No −→
EMU Slovenia - San Marino No ←→
Singapore - Brunei Darussalam No −→
SOUTH AFRICA Swaziland - Namibia Yes -1.117 −→
SOUTH AFRICA South Africa - Namibia Yes -0.964 −→
SOUTH AFRICA Swaziland - South Africa No ←−
USA Panama - Bahamas, The Yes -1.94 −→
USA El Salvador - Ecuador No ←−
USA El Salvador - Bahamas, The No ←−
USA Ecuador - Bahamas, The Yes -1.725 ←−
USA United States - Ecuador Yes -0.629 −→
USA United States - Panama No ←→
USA Panama - El Salvador Yes -4.547 −→
∗ The arrow’s direction indicates which country’s price level Granger causes Continued on next page
the other country’s price level. ←→ indicates bicausality.
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Table 3.10 – continued from previous page
Currency Union Country Pair (country 1 & country 2) Cointegrated Coefficient for Granger
country 2 Causality∗
USA United States - El Salvador No −→
USA Panama - Ecuador Yes -0.982 −→
USA United States - Bahamas, The Yes -1.466 −→
WAEMU Togo - Senegal No ←→
WAEMU Senegal - Guinea-Bissau Yes -0.744 ←→
WAEMU Guinea-Bissau - Coˆte d’Ivoire Yes -0.963 ←−
WAEMU Niger - Coˆte d’Ivoire No ←−
WAEMU Mali - Guinea-Bissau Yes -0.885 ←→
WAEMU Mali - Benin No ←−
WAEMU Togo - Benin Yes -0.824 ←−
WAEMU Togo - Niger No ←→
WAEMU Togo - Burkina Faso No −→
WAEMU Senegal - Niger No ←−
WAEMU Guinea-Bissau - Benin Yes -0.868 ←−
WAEMU Senegal - Mali Yes -0.968 ←→
WAEMU Niger - Guinea-Bissau Yes -0.991 −→
WAEMU Coˆte d’Ivoire - Benin No ←−
WAEMU Mali - Coˆte d’Ivoire No ←→
WAEMU Niger - Mali Yes -1.133 −→
WAEMU Togo - Coˆte d’Ivoire No −→
WAEMU Mali - Burkina Faso No ←→
WAEMU Niger - Benin No ←−
WAEMU Niger - Burkina Faso No ←−
WAEMU Senegal - Benin No ←−
WAEMU Togo - Mali Yes -1.144 ←→
WAEMU Senegal - Burkina Faso No ←→
WAEMU Coˆte d’Ivoire - Burkina Faso Yes -1.391 ←→
∗ The arrow’s direction indicates which country’s price level Granger causes Continued on next page
the other country’s price level. ←→ indicates bicausality.
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Table 3.10 – continued from previous page
Currency Union Country Pair (country 1 & country 2) Cointegrated Coefficient for Granger
country 2 Causality∗
WAEMU Senegal - Coˆte d’Ivoire No ←→
WAEMU Togo - Guinea-Bissau Yes -0.99 ←→
WAEMU Burkina Faso - Benin Yes -0.782 ←−
WAEMU Guinea-Bissau - Burkina Faso Yes -1.011 ←−
110
Table 3.11: Pairs lacking both Cointegration and
Granger Causality
Currency Union Country Pair
Australia Tonga - Australia
Cemac Madagascar - Cameroon
Cemac Equatorial Guinea - Congo, Rep.
Cemac Madagascar - Gabon
Eccu St. Kitts and Nevis - Dominica
Eccu Dominica - Barbados
Eccu St. Lucia - Anguilla
Eccu Grenada - Anguilla
Eccu St. Lucia - Barbados
Eurozone Slovenia - Ireland
Eurozone San Marino - Montenegro
Eurozone Slovenia - Portugal
Eurozone San Marino - Belgium
Eurozone Greece - Austria
Eurozone Portugal - France
Eurozone Luxembourg - Austria
Eurozone Ireland - France
Eurozone Montenegro - Italy
Eurozone Ireland - Austria
Eurozone Montenegro - Finland
Eurozone Slovenia - Austria
Eurozone Italy - Finland
Eurozone Spain - Montenegro
Eurozone France - Austria
Eurozone Netherlands - Montenegro
Eurozone San Marino - Germany
Eurozone Portugal - Ireland
Eurozone Montenegro - Austria
Eurozone Slovenia - Finland
Eurozone Netherlands - France
Eurozone Italy - Belgium
Eurozone Montenegro - France
Eurozone Portugal - Montenegro
Eurozone France - Finland
Eurozone Germany - Belgium
Eurozone Spain - Luxembourg
Eurozone Montenegro - Greece
Eurozone Netherlands - Belgium
Eurozone San Marino - Austria
Continued on next page
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Table 3.11 – continued from previous page
Currency Union Country Pair
Eurozone Portugal - Luxembourg
Eurozone Luxembourg - Ireland
Eurozone Finland - Belgium
Eurozone Portugal - Austria
Eurozone Montenegro - Luxembourg
India-Bhutan India - Bhutan
South Africa South Africa - Lesotho
South Africa Swaziland - Lesotho
South Africa Namibia - Lesotho
Dollarized Timor-Leste - Ecuador
Dollarized Timor-Leste - El Salvador
Dollarized Timor-Leste - Bahamas, The
Dollarized Timor-Leste - Panama
Dollarized United States - Timor-Leste
Table 3.12: Share of country pairs exhibiting cointegration in ln CPI
Currency Union Only during CU membership With countries outside CU
Australia zone 0.00 14.02
Cemac 58.82 31.86
Dollaried zone 40.0 35.93
Eccu 23.53 35.27
Eurozone 7.62 16.34
India-Bhutan 0.00 7.14
Rand zone 33.33 29.56
Singapore-Brunei 0.00 9.52
Waemu 46.43 29.31
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Table 3.13: Share of country pairs exhibiting Granger Causality in ln CPI
Currency Union Only during CU membership With countries outside CU
Australia zone 0.00 13.55
Cemac 55.88 31.08
Dollaried zone 36.67 29.71
Eccu 52.94 24.78
Eurozone 37.62 31.91
India-Bhutan 0.00 16.96
Rand zone 25.00 24.36
Singapore-Brunei 50.00 13.1
Waemu 71.43 39.85
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